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THE NLRB'S DISCOVERY PRACTICE AND THE
PROCEDURAL EFFECT OF BILL JOHNSON'S
RESTAURANT, INC. v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
BOARD
The National Labor Relations Act (the "NLRA'')I authorizes the National Labor
Relations Board (the "Board") to make rules and regulations necessary to carry out the
provisions of the NLRA. 2 Pursuant  to this authority the Board has always limited pre-
hearing discovery in unfair labor practice proceedings. 6 elle Board reasons that its
restrictive discovery rules and regulations are necessary to prevent et»ployers and unions
from intimidating employees and inhibiting employees front exercising statutory rights
under the NLRA.4 In National Labor Relations Board v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co.,' the
United States Supreme Court supported the Board's restrictions on discovery by holding
that pre-hearing witness statements are exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of
Information Act s By so holding, t he Court endorsed a previous line of circuit court cases
which had expressly upheld the Board's discovery rules.' Despite this judicial approval,
employers and unions, eager to obtain information regarding unfair labor practice
charges brought against them, have used a number of tactics in attempting to circumvent
the Board's restrictive discovery rules." Although most of these attempts have been
unsuccessful, in the recent case of Bill johloon's Restaurants, Irrc. v. National Labor Relations
Boar-d,9 the Supreme Court opened a potential procedural loophole in unfair labor-
practice proceedings that may encourage employers and unions to bring frivolous state
court suits for the purpose of using state court discovery procedures to bypass t he Board's
rest riction.°
* The author gratefully acknowledges the conceptual ideas and assistance provided by Visiting
Associate Professor Kenneth B. Hipp.
29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982). 49 Stat. 449 - 57 (1935), as amended by 61 Slat. 136-52 (1947), 65
Stat. 601 (1951), 72 Stat. 945 (1958), 73 Stat. 525 -42 (1959), 84 Stat. 930 (1970), 88 Stat. 395-97
(1974), 88 Stat. 1972 (1975), 94 Star. 347 (1980), 94 Stat. 3452 (1980), 29 U.S.C. 169 (Stipp 1981).
2 See 29 U.S.C. 4 156 (1982).
• N.L.R.B. Case Handling Manual, Part I, Unfair Labor Practice Proceedings, (CCH)ll 10292.4
(1983) [hereinafter cited as N.L.R.B. Case Handling Manual]; see also 2 "I HE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw
1625 (C. Morris 2d ed. 1983) [hereinafter cited as THE DEvcromm; LABOR LAW].
• See infra notes 80-86 and accompanying text.
5 437 U.S. 214 (1978).
• Id. at 236: see also iry'ra notes 87 - 111 and accompanying text.
7 See Rogeri. Au & Son v. NLRB, 538 F.2d 80, 83 (3d Cir. 1976); NLRB v. Valley Mold Co. Inc.,
530 F.2d 693, 695 (6th Cir. 1976); D'Ynuville Manor, Lowell, Mass., Inc. v. NLRB, 526 F.2d 3, 7 (1st
Cir 1975); NLRB v. lnterboro Contractors, Inc., 432 F.2d 854, 858-60 (2d Cir. 1970),cer1. denied, 402
U.S. 915 (1971); North American Rockwell Corp. v. NLRB, 389 F.2d 866, 871-74 (10th Cir. 1968);
NLRB v. Vapor Blast Mfg. Co., 287 F.2d 402, 407-08 (7th Cir. 1961); NLRB v. Globe Wireless Ltd.,
193 F.2d 748, 751 (9th Cir. 1951).
• See infra notes 148-68 and accompanying test,
9 103 S. Ct. 2161 (1983).
'" Discovery is so desirable to respondents in Board proceeding; that the opening created by Bill
Johnson's will result in a large number of civil cases being filed for cliscovery purposes. See NLRB v.
Robbins Tire & Rubber CO., 437 U.S. 214, 237 n.17 (1978). In Rabbits the Court stated that "if the
Court of Appeals ruling below were not reversed, the Board anticipated that prehearing requests for
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In Bill Johnson's, the Board found that an employer had brought a state court libel
action against an employee in retaliation for the employee's having previously filed an
unfair labor practice complaint against the employer." The Board concluded that the
retaliatory lawsuit was an unfair labor practice and, pursuant to its authority under the
NLRA, ordered the employer to cease prosecuting the state court act ion. 12 On appeal, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the Board's order. 13
 In a
unanimous decision the Supreme Court reversed and remanded. The Court held that
because of a civil litigant's constitutional right of access to state court, the Board could not
order an employer or union to halt a state court action unless the suit was found to he
both retaliatory and without merit." The Court then established a new standard that the
Board must use in determining whether a retaliatory civil suit is baseless, that is, without
merit . 15 Prior to Bill Johnson's the Board focused its inquiry on the retaliatory motive of the
state court action. 18
 Although the Board would also refer to the state court suit's lack of a
reasonable basis, such lack of basis was only the means by which the Board inferred a
retaliatory rnotive. 17 Under the new standard established by the Supreme Cowl in Bill
Johnson's, however, the Board must consider the merits of the state court action indepen-
dently of its determination of retaliatory motive.' 8 Ft11 . 1 he rni ore, in evaluating the basis of
the stale court suit the Board is prohibited from deciding genuine issues of material fact
or issues of state law.L 9
The problem created by BillJohnson's is that in an effort to protect the civil litigant's
constitutional rights, the Supreme Court has limited the Board's ability to determine the
basis of a state court act ion. 2" This decision may encourage employers and unions to tile
retaliatory civil suits whenever an unfair labor practice complaint is filed against them
because, in all but the most extreme cases, the Board will now be unable to order such
suits enjoined. 2 ' Employers and unions, who have historically been frustrated in their
attempts to obtain discovery in Board proceedings, may begin to take advantage of the
narrow standard established in Bill Johnson's by bringing frivolous civil lawsuits in an
witnesses' statements under FOIA would he made by employer-respondents in virtually all unfair
labor practice proceedings." Id. Thus, if employers and unions are willing to Ming a separate FOI A
suit in federal district court to obtain discovery, it seems likely that they would bring state court suits
to accomplish the same thing. See also Petition for Cert. of' t he National Labor Relations Board at 9,
Robbins.
" Bill john.son's Restaurants, Inc., 249 N.L.R.B. 155, 162-65 (1980).
12 hl. at 169-70.
13 Bill Johnson's Restaurants, lac. v. NLRB, 660 F.2d 1335, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981).
Bill johnson's, 103 S. Ct. at 2171.
12 Id. at 2171 - 73.
' 8 See id. at 2168; we also infra note 196 and accompanying text.
11 See infra notes 197-205 and accompanying text.
18 see Bill I riltwvoll,v, 103 S. Ct. at 2173.
' Id. at 2171.
2" This is the mandate of Bill Johnson's, and, given the C01151111flional considerations involved, the
Court's holding seems legally sound. See infra notes 253 -58 and accompanying text.
See Bill Johnson's, 249 N.L.R.B. at 168. In Bill Johnson's the admin istrat ive  law judge stated:
It would hardly make sense to allow litigants to gain access to the substance of these
statements through the use of state discovery procedures. Such a rule permitting such
conduct would certainly promote the tiling of'suits, meritorious or not in state court to
take advantage of discovery procedures 1101 available to the litigants in a Board pro-
ceeding.
Id.
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effort to use liberal state court discovery procedures to circumvent the Board's restrictive
procedures. 22 Consequently, an indirect result of the Supreme Court's ruling in Bill
Johnson's is that the purpose and policy of the Board's discovery rules, which the Court
had endorsed in Robbins, may be undermined.
Because civil litigants have a right to have the merits of their claims adjudicated in
state court, the Supreme Court's holding in Bill Johnson's, which prohibits the Board from
determining the merits of a state court action, is legally sound." Any remedy designed to
deal with the procedural loophole created by Bill Johnson's, therefore, must maintain the
rights of civil litigants. 24 Such a remedy is available if the Board exercises its power
pursuant to section 10(j) of the NLRA." Section 10(j) of the NLRA authorizes the Board
to petition a federal district court to temporarily enjoin unfair labor practices pending the
final outcome of a Board proceeding. 26 Under this provision the Board could seek to
enjoin state court suits brought for the purpose of bypassing the Board's discovery rules
as unfair labor practices until the Board's initial unfair labor practice hearing concluded."
Closing the procedural loophole created by Bill Johnson's with a procedural remedy,
therefore, would preserve employers' and unions' constitutional right of access to state
courts at the same time that it would safeguard employees from intimidation.
This note will begin by detailing the Board's current rules and regulations governing
discovery. The note will then discuss the devices used by employers and unions attempt-
ing to circumvent the Board's discovery rules and the standard the Board had previously
used to enjoin retaliatory state court suits. Next, this note will analyze Bill Johnson's and the
procedural loophole the decision has created in the Board's discovery procedures. Finally,
an alternative procedural approach employing section 10(j) of the NLRA will be pro-
posed. This proposal will not only allow the Board to safeguard its proceedings, but will
also preserve the constitutional rights with which the Court was concerned in Bill
Johnson's,
I. DISCOVERY BEFORE THE BOARD
One of the primary purposes of the NLRA was the establishment of a balance of
bargaining power between employers and employees, so as to avoid industrial strife. 28 To
accomplish this broad purpose, the NLRA created legally enforceable rights for employ-
ees to organize, bargain collectively, and engage in concerted activities." The NLRA also
established the Board as an independent administrative agency to interpret and enforce
the NLRA. 3° In enforcing the NLRA the Board holds trial type hearings' that are subject
to the Board's own procedural rules. 32
22 See infra notes 285-89 and accompanying text.
22 See infra noses 253-60 and accompanying text.
24 See Bill Johnson's, 103 S. Ct. at 2171-73.
25
 See 29 U.S.C. I I60(j) (1982).
28 See infra notes 319-20 and accompanying text.
27 Id. See also infra notes 313 - 18.
28 See 29 U.S.C. 151 (1982); see also 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 3, at 28 .
29
 See 29 U.S.C. 157 (1982); see also 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 3, at 28 .
3° See 29 U.S.C. 153 (1982); see also 2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 3, at 1599-1601.
3 ' See 29 U.S.C. 160 (1982); see also 2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW,Supra note 3, at 1621-22 .
32 See 29 U.S.C. 156 (1982).
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A. The Board's Discovery Rates
The Board's procedural rules do not provide for genera] pre-hearing discovery in
unfair labor practice proceedings." Once an allegation of an unfair labor practice is
brought by an individual or an organization, 34
 the Board's regional office undertakes its
own investigation . 35
 During this investigation, statements — usually from employees —
and other evidence are obtained." The regional director will then determine whether to
issue a complaint. 37
 If a complaint is issued, it must be specific." The complaint will then
be prosecuted by the General Counsel." Despite the Board's general prohibition of
pre-hearing discovery, its rules do provide for motions for bills of particulars," deposi-
tions,'' subpoenas," and pre-hearing conferences." Although none of these devices are
designed for discovery purposes," employers and unions can use Ahem to gain limited
in form ation . 45
Motions for bills of particulars are allowed for the limited purpose of clarifying a
complaint or answer." Depositions, although expressly allowed by the Board's rules,' are
available only upon a showing of "good cause," and are limited to those situations where
there is reason to believe that the witness whose deposition is sought may be unavailable to
N.L.R.B. Case Handling Manual, supra note 3, at 11 10292.4. This provision stales; "The
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure providing for compulsory pretrail discovery have been held not
applicable to Board proceedings. They should not he used by the trial attorney; any attempt by the
parties to use them should he resisted."
See also 29 C.F.R. §§ 102.117, 102.118 (1983), which describes the material the Board will release,
and the material it considers confidential. For a general discussion of these rules see intro notes 38-58
and accompanying text.
' See 29 C.F.R. § 102.9 (1983) (limiting the initiation of unfair labor practices charges to private
parties).
35
 2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR I,AW, supra note 3, at 1617-18.
36 See N.L.R.B. Case Handling Manual, supra note 3, at II 10058.2.
" See 29 C.F.R. § 102.15 (1983).
" Id. Section 102.15 provides, in part, that:
The complaint shall contain (a) a clear and concise statement of the facts upon which
assertion of jurisdiction by the Board is predicated, and (h) a clear and concise descrip-
tion of the acts which are claimed to constitute unfair labor practices, including, where
known, the approximate dates and places of such acts and the names of respondent's
agents or other representatives by whom committed.
/41.
39 See 2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 3, at 1621. In response to criticism that the
Board operated unfairly as prosecutor, judge, and jury of the NLRA, Congress separated the judicial
and prosecutorial functions. Id, at 1599-1600. The Board retained the judicial function, and a new
official, designated as General Counsel, was created to handle the investigative and prosecutorial
functions. The Board is, therefore, "a single enforcement agency with authority divided between two
independent units." Id. See also 29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (1982) (setting out the General Counsel's
authority).
40 29 C.F.R. §§ 102.24-102.28 (1983).
41 29 G.P.R. § 102.30.
42
	 G.F.R. § 102.31.
" 29	 § 102,35(g).
44
 See supra note 33.
" See Ora notes 46-58 and accompanying text.
48 See N.L.R.B. Case Handling Manual, supra note 3, at
	 10292.1, 10292.2.
47 29 C.F.R. § 102.30 (1983).
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testify at the hearing.' The Board's rules also prohibit any of its employees from
producing any "files, documents, reports, memoranda, or records of the Board or of the
general counsel . ' unless production is required by the Freedom of Information Act or
authorized in writing by the Board." This general prohibition is tempered, however', by a
right of access to pre-trial statements given by a witness who actually testifies at the
hearing. 5" Nevertheless, these statements need only be produced after the completion of
the witness' direct testimony.' Employers and unions, therefore, have no right to discover
witness' statements prior to the hearing. 52
Subpoenas are available to all parties in an unfair labor practice proceeding to
compel either the test imony of a winless or the product ion of inforrnali01). 53 While the use
of subpoenas by the Board to compel evidence front an employer or union prior to a
hearing has been universally upheld,' subpoenas have not been effective in compelling
testimony of Board employees, or in obtaining materials from the Board's files." The
Board's rules also authorize the administrative law judge ("ALA") to hold pre-hearing
conferences" designed to "avoid surprise" and "simplify the issues." 57 Moreover, the AI]
has the authority to conduct the hearing in intervals," granting employers and unions
extra time to prepare defenses.
In addition to the specific procedures provided under the Board's rules, the Board
and courts have recognized that employers or unions have the right to interrogate
48 29 C.F.R. § 102.30 does not expressly preclude the use of depositions for discovery; however.
the N.L.R.B. Case Handling Manual, supra note 3, at '11,] 10352.1, provides that, "depositions may not
he used merely for the purpose of pretrial discovery." Id.
For a discussion of the United Stales federal circuit courts' views on the Board's interpretation,
sec infra notes 112-35 and accompanying text.
▪ 29 C.F.R.	 102.118(a); see also Title Guarantee Co. v. NLRB, 534 F.2d 484, 487 (2d Cir.
1976).
88 29 C.F.R. § 102.118(h). This rule is tailored after thefeticks rule. In Jencks v. United Stares,
353 U.S. 657, 668-69 (1957), the United States Supreme Court held that in a criminal action, a
defendant is entitled to the prior statements made by a witness once t hat witness has testified. The
Court's rationale rested on the impeachment value of the statements for cross examination purposes.
Id. at 667. In NI,RB v. Adhesive Products Corp., 258 F.2c1 403, 408 -09 (2d Cir. 1958), the Second
Circuit applied theleticks rule to Board proceedings. The Board subsequently accepted this rule in
Ra-Rich Mfg. Corp., 121 N.L.R.B. 700, 701 -02 (1958). See alAo Manheck Baking Co., 130 N.L.R.B.
1186, 1190 (1961).
" See 2 THE DEVELOPING LAII012 LAW, supra note 3, at 1626.
" Id.
• 29 C.F.R. § 102.31 (1983).
." See North American Rockwell Corp. v. NLRB, 389 F.2d 866, 872 (10th Cir. 1968); Storkhne
Corp. v. NLRB, 298 F.2d 276, 277 (5th Cir. 1962); NLRB v. Anchor Rome Mills, Inc., 197 F.2d 447,
449 (5th Cir. 1952); NLRB v. British Auto Parts, Inc., 266 F. Stipp. 368, 372 (C.D. Cal. 1967).
" See North American Rockwell Corp. v. NLRB, 389 F.2d 866, 871-73 (10th Cir. 1968). (The
Board has the authority to formulate its own rules for unfair labor practice hearings, and as
102.118 of the Board's rules prevented the discovery of evidence held by the Board or its employees,
a subpeona which attempted to compel such information is invalid.) Cf NLRB v, Health Tee
Division, 566 F.2d 1367, 1371 (91 h Cir. 1978). (The administrative taw judge is required to make an
independent evaluation or the privilege of nondisclosure, and not merely rely on the existence of §
102.118 before quashing a subpoena.)
• 29 C.F.R. § 102.35(g) (1983).
47 See N.L.R.B. Case Handling Manual, supra note 3, at 111 111 10381, 10381.1.
'8 See 29 C.F.R. § 102.43 (granting discretion to the administrative law judge to continue the
hearing from day to day).
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employees to perpare their defenses in an unfair labor practice hearing.'" In exercising
this right, however, the employer or union must explain to the employee the purpose of
the questioning, and obtain the employee's voluntary participation.' Further, the ques-
tioning must occur in a context free from hostility and cannot be coercive in nature. 6 '
Finally, the questions cannot exceed the legitimate purpose of the interrogation by prying
into extraneous matters, or by interfering with the employee's rights under the NLRA. 62
To enforce this limitation on the scope of the questioning, the Board has taken the
position that an employer or union violates section 8(a)( I) of the N LRA 63
 by interrogating
an employee with the intent to learn whether the employee gave a statement to a Board
investigator, or by asking the employee for a copy of such a statement."
The Board's policy of restricting pre-hearing discovery stands in direct contrast to
the liberal discovery provisions contained in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure," and a
majority of the states that have adopted discovery procedures similar to those of the
Federal Rules." The scope of discovery contemplated by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure is extremely broad."' Unlike the Board, which provides for only a limited form
of depositions," the Federal Rules provide flexible devices for oral69 and written' deposi-
tions, interrogatories," production of documents," physical examinations," and requests
for admissions." These Federal Rules are premised on the goals of eliminating surprise,'
56
	
joy Silk Mills, Inc. v. NLRB, 185 F.2d 732, 743 (D,C, Cir. 1950); Montgomery Ward &
Co., Inc., 146 N.L.R.B. 76, 79-80 (1964); May Department Stores Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 94, 95 (1946).
6° See Johnnie's Poultry Co., 146 N.L.R.B. 770, 775 (1964), enforcement denied. 344 F.2d 617 (8th
Cir. 1965). The Eighth Circuit's reversal of the Board's decision in Johnnie's Poultry was based on the
quantum of evidence, and, therefore, other courts have not regarded the Eighth Circuit's decision as
a rejection of the principle enunciated by the Board. Id. at 618-20. See Montgomery Ward & Co. v.
NLRB, 877 F.2d 452, 456 (6th Cir. 1967); NLRB v. Netthoff.Bros. Packers, Inc., 375 F.2d 372, 378
(5th Cir. 1967).
Si Johnnie's Poultry Co., 146 N,1„R,B, 770, 775 (1964), enlirrcernent denied, 344 F.2d 617 (8th Cir.
1965).
62 Id.
63 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1982). This section makes it an unfair labor practice "to interfere with,
restrain, or coerce employees in I he exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 (right to organize
and collectively bargain] of this title." Id.
" See W. T. Grant Co., 144 N.L.R.B. 1179, 1180 (1963); Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 143 N.L.R.B.
848, 849 (1963).
" The discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are set out in rules 26 - 37,
FED, R. Civ. P. '26-37.
64 See Development in the Law —Discovery, 74 HARI:. L. REv. 940, 950 (1961); Wright, Procedural
Reform in the States, 24 F.R.D. 85, 86.88 (1959). Because a majority of states have discovery provisions
similar to the Federal Rules, this note will contrast the Board's discovers' rules to those of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. For an indepth comparison of the Board's rules and the discovery rules of
federal procedure, see Comment, NLRB Discovery Practice: The Applicability of the Disrovery Provisions of
the Federal Rules al Civil Procedure, 1976 B.Y.U. L. REV. 895, 864-74.
67 C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 543 (4th ed. 1983).
" See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
89 FED. R. Cry. P. 30; see also C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 566-74 (4th ed. 1983)
[hereinafter cited as C. WRicarr].
7° Fr.o. R. Civ. P. 31; see also C. WRIGHT, supra note 69, at 574-75.
71 FED. R. Cis'. P. 33; see also C. WRI G HT,n 	 supra note 69, at 575 -83.
7' FED. R. Civ. P. 34; see also C. WRIGHT, supra note 69, at 584-87.
73 Fro. R. Civ. P. 35; see also C. Wuwirr, .supra note 69, at 588-92.
74 FED. R. CR, . 1'. 36; see also C. WRIGHT, supra note 69, at 592 - 95.
74 See United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958).
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allowing both sides of the controversy to become adequately prepared for trial,'" and
providing a fuller and more balanced disclosure of facts." Although abuses of discovery
arc a problem,' the benefits of a liberal discovery practice are generally recognized as
being greater than the drawbacks.'
The Board, on the other hand, justifies its restrictive discovery policy by reasoning
that witnesses in labor litigation are especially susceptible to retaliation and coercion
because of the unique nature of the employer-employee or union-employee relation-
ship." Consequently, the Board has exercised its rulemaking discretion"' under section 6
of the N1_,RA" to strike a balance in favor of protecting the tights of the employees over
the competing interest of providing; employers and unions with the right of open discov-
ery." According to the Board, its limited discovery procedures adequately protect the
rights of all parties."' The Board maintains that employees would be unwilling to cooper-
ate in investigations and that they would not give candid statements if they knew that their
statements could be obtained by their employer or union prior to the hearing." 5 Further-
more, the Board takes the position that discovery would delay unfair labor practice
proceedings, and interfere with the Board's role in carrying out the NL,RA."
B. Robbins and the Judicial View of Discovery be/ore the Board
The United States Supreme Court supported the Board's position on pre-hearing
discovery in National Labor Relations . Board v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co." In Robbins, the
Court held that pre-hearing witness statements were exempt from disclosure under the
Freedom of 1/11bl- illation Act ("FOI Al" until the completion of the Board's unfair labor
" See C. WRIGHT, .supra note 69, at 540.
" One of the underlying purposes of the federal discovery rules is to eliminate the "sporting
theory of justice. - So' eriedinan v. American Pigment Corp., 253 F.2(1803, 808 (4th Cir. 1958); see obit
Development in the Law —Discovery, 74 HAM'. L. Rev. 940, 945 (1961).
" See C. Wincarr, .su,nra note 69, at 541-42, 560-66.
Id. at 540.
"" See NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 239 (1978); NLRB v. Litdale Knitting
Mills, inc., 523 F.2(1 978, 980 (2d Cir. 1975); NLRB v. National Survey Service, Inc., 361 F.2d 199,
206 (7th Cir. t966), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 823 (1961).
" For cases supporting the Board's rulemaking discretion in the area of discovery, see NLRB v.
Valley Mold Co., Inc., 530 F.2d 693, 695 (6th Cir. 1976); D'Youville Manor, Lowell, Mass., Inc. v.
NLRB, 526 F.2d 3, 7 (1st Cir. 1975); NLRB v. Interboro Contractors, Inc., 432 F.2d 854, 858 (2d Cir.
1970); Elect romec Design and Development Co., Inc. v. NLRB, 409 F.2(1 631, 635 (9111 Cir. 1969).
" 29 U.S.C. 1 156 (1982). This provision provides: "The Board shall have authority from time
to time to make, amend, and rescind, in the manner prescribed  such rules and regulations as
may he necessary to carry out the provisions of this subchapter." Id.
" The Board's authority to strike difficult balances in labor policy has been recognized by the
Supreme Court. See NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local 449, 353 U.S. 87, 96 (1957). In Truck Drivers, the
Court stated: "The function of striking [the] balance to effectuate national labor policy is often a
difficult and delicate responsibility, which the Congress has committed primarily to the National
Labor Relations Board, subject to limited judicial review. - M.
84 See Capital Cities Communications, Inc. v. NLRB, 409 F. Stipp. 971. 977 (N.D. Cal. 1976);
Ronald Hackenberger, 236 N.L.R.B. 1065 (1978); Mid - West Paper Products Co., 223 N.L.R.B. 1367
(1976).
"5 See NI.RB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214,240 (1978); NLRB v. National Survey
Service, Inc., 361 1F'.2(1 199, 206 (7th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 823 (1961).
" See NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 237-38 (1978).
" 437 U.S. 214 (1978).
"" 5 U.S.0 § 552 (1982). Originally passed in 1976, the FOIA is a comprehensive disclosure
statute designed to allow citizens to obtain information collected by administrative agencies, unless
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practice proceedings." Although the Supreme Court's decision in Robbins was limited to
witness statements in the context of a FOIA request," because the Board claimed that the
release of witness statements would interfere with its enforcement proceedings," the
Court's resolution of the issue involved a general examination of the Board's discovery
practice."
In Robbins, the Board issued an unfair labor practice complaint against an employer
for alleged interference with the protected rights of its employees stemming - from a
contested union representation election." Invoking the FOIA, the employer requested
copies of all statements of potential witnesses obtained by the Board during its investiga-
tion." The Board refused to disclose this information arguing that the statements were
part of its investigatory record compiled for law enforcement purposes anti, therefore,
were exempt from disclosure under' the FO1A."'' Subsequently, the employer sued the
Board in federal district court seeking to compel the release of these statements." The
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a district court decision ordering the Board to
deliver the statements." Viewing the disclosure question in the context of the Board's
discovery procedures,"" the appeals court reasoned that the Board had the burden of
the documents requested fall into one of nine statutory exceptions. 5 U.S.C. 552(h) (1)-(9). See 1
K.C. DAVIS. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 5:1-5:3 (1978).
"9 Bobbins, 437 U.S. at 236.
9" The Court refused to give its "view as to the validity of the Fifth Circuit's approach to Board
discovery." Id. at 237 n.16. For Fibh Circuit's view as contrasted to nuOority of other circuits, see infro
notes 123.35 and accompanying text.
91 Id. at 216.
92 Id. at 236. The Court stated:
The remaining question is whether the Board has met its burden of' demonstrating that
disclosure of the potential witnesses' statements at this lime "would interfere with
enforcement proceedings." A proper resolution of this question requires us to weigh
the strong presumption in favor of disclosure under MIA against the likelihood that
disclosure at this time would disturb the existing balance of relations in unfair labor
practice proceedings, a delicate balance that Congress has deliberately sought to pre-
serve and that the Board maintains is essential to the effective enforcement of the
NI,RA.
Id. The Court then launched into an inquiry of the rationale for the Board's restrictive discovery
practice. Id. at 236-42.
" Id. at 216. Upon a petition filed by the Aluminum Workers International Union, AFL-CIO
(the Union), the Board conducted a representation election among a unit of employees of the
Robbins Tire & Rubber Co. Sre Brief for the NLRB at 4-5, Robbins, The,Union received 244 votes,
while 248 were cast against it, 10 ballots were challenged. Id. at 4. The Union filed objections, alleging
that the employer had interfered with the election, Id. at 4-5. The Board issued an unfair labor
practice complaint against the employer for alleged violations of section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA,
including (1) interrogating employees about their union activities; (2) promising benefits if the
employees rejected the Union; and (3) threatening to discharge employees if the Union was elected.
Id. at 5.
" Robbins, 437 U.S. at 216.
" Id. at 216-17. Exempt ion 7(A) of the FOI A provides that disclosure is not required of "matters
that are investigatory records compiled for law enfOrcement purposes, but only to the extent that
production of' such records would ... interfere with enforcement proceedings." 5 U.S.C. §
552(h)(7)(A) (1982).
"c' 437 U.S. at 217.
"7 Robbins Tire & Rubber Co. v. NLRB, 563 F.2d 724, 733 (5th Cir. 1977).
" Id. at 726. The court stated; "This is a Freedom of Information Act (MIA) case, although it
takes on the troubling coloration of a dispute about the discovery rights of respondents in National





demonstrating that witness intimidation was likely to occur in specific cases. Absent a
demonstration of such intimidation, the court concluded, there was no blanket exemption
from the FOIA for witness statements obtained in the course of Board investigations,"
The Supreme Court granted the Board's petition for certiorari"' and reversed the Fifth
Circuit, holding that witness statements were exempt from disclosure under the 1;01A
and that no particularized showing of employee intimidation was required."'
The Robbins Court recognized that a "profound alteration - in unfair labor practice
proceedings would result if witnesses' statements were disclosed prior to a Board hear-
ing,102 Interpreting the FOIA as a statute designed to deal with agency disclosure in
general, (he Court refused to allow the statute to he used as a means to undercut the
Board's authority to control its unfair labor practice proceedings."' The Court em-
phasized the significant potential for employers or unions to use discovery as a means of
coercing employees in an effort to discourage employees from exercising their statutory
rights.'" Recognizing that the effectiveness of the NLRA depends upon employee coop-
eration,'" the Court was unwilling to overrule indirectly the Board's "long tradition" of
prohibiting pre-hearing discovery'" in unfair labor practice proceedings.
The Robbi»s Court was also conscious of the Board's Congressional mandate to
interpret the NLRA, and of the balance the Board must strike in dealing with labor
disputes. 11 " Absent a congressional directive to the contrary, the Court refused to inter-
fere with the Board's discretion to control unfair labor practice proceedings.'" In a
" id, at 732.
" 1 NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 434 U.S. 1061 (1978). The Fifth Circuit's decision in
Robbins was in conflict with the weight of circuit authority. Robbins, 437 U.S. at 219 n.5. While the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit had taken a position similar to the Fifth
Circuit,ser Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hospital Authority v. Perry, 571 F.2c1195, '200 -02 (4th Cir. 1978)
(a case involving witnesses' statements obtained during a pending Equal Employment Opportunity
Cornmission investigation), the majority of circuits had followed the approach of the Second Circuit
in Title Guarantee Co. v. NLRB, 534 F.2d 484, 491-92 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 834
(1976). The decisions that followed the Second Circuit include: Abrahamson Chrysler-Plymouth,
inc. v. NCRII, 561 F,2d 63, 64-65 (71h Cir. 1977): NLRB v. Hardernan Garment Corp., 557 F.2d 559,
563 (6111 Cir. 1977); Harvey's Wagon Wheel, Inc. v. NLRB, 550 F.2d 1139, 1142-43 (9th Cir. 1976);
New England Medical Center Hospital v. NLRB, 548 F.2d 377, 385 -87 (1st Cir. 1976); Climax
Molybdenum Co. v. NLRB, 539 F,2d 63, 65 (10th Cir. 1976): Roger J. Au R Son v. NLRB, 538 F.2d
80, 83 (3d Cir. 1976).
Robbins, 437 U.S. at 236.
"12 Id. at 237.
'')3 Id, at 238 -39.
'" id. at 239. The Court stated: "The most obvious risk of 'interference' with enfOrcement
proceedings in this context is that employers or, in some cases, unions will coerce or intimidate
employees and others who have given statements, in an effort to make them change their testimony
or not testify at all. - Id.
1 " Id. at 240. The Court stated: "Furthermore, both employees and nonemployees may be
reluctant to give statements to NLRB investigators at all, absent assurances that unless called to testify
in a hearing, their statements will he exempt from disclosure until the unfair labor practice charge
has been adjudicated," Id.
Id. at 239. The Court stated: "Our reluctance to override a long tradition of agency discov-
ery, based on noshing more than all amendment to a statute designed to deal with a wholly different
problem, is strengthened by our conclusion that the danger posed by premature release of the
statements sought here would involve precisely the kind of 'interference with enforcement proceed-
ings' that Exemption 7(A) was designed to avoid," Id.
107 See id. at 238,
sos
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concurring opinion, Justice Stevens stated that interpreting the MIA as authorizing
discovery greater than the Board's own rules would he "meddling" in die Board's en-
forcement proceedings.'" Thus, despite the limited scope of the issue before the Court,"°
the Robbins opinion was a strong affirmation of the Board's discovery policy."'
In addition to the Supreme Court's endorsement of the Board's limited discovery
rules a majorit y of the decisiotis" 2 among the circuit courts of appeals that have ex pressly
addressed the issue of pre-hearing discovery before the Board have upheld the Board's
posnion. 13
 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has consistently
held that the Board is not required to provide pre-hearing discovery."' In National Labor
Relalions Board v. I pderbory Contractors, ," 5
 the Board directed an employer I o pay
certain sums as back pay awards to two employees who had been wrongfully clis-
charged.u 6
 In granting an enforcement order for the Board, the Second Circuit held first,
that the employer had no constitutional right to pre-trial discovery."' Second, the court
held that section 10(h) of the NI.,RA, which provides that the Board's proceedings should
he conducted in accordance with  federal rules of evidence,'" did not specifically authorize
or require 1 he Board to adopt discovery procedures in unfair labor practice hearings.'
1" Id, at 243 (Stevens, J., concurring).
1 ") 'hie issue in Robbins was whether the MIA required the Board to disclose witnesses'
statements prior to an unfair labor practice hearing. Robbins, 937 U.S. at 216. See also sceptre notes
90-92 and accompanying text.
1 " The Board has viewed the Court's decision in Robbins as supporting its general denial of
pre -hearing discovery. See Equitable Life Assurance Society and District 925. Service Employees
International Union, 266 N.L.R.B. No. 135, 6 (May 4, 1983); Westinghouse Electric Corp., 239
N.L.R.B. 106, 121 n.76 (1978). The Board reading of Robbins as supporting its position on discovery
relies on the fact that witness statements are the essential evidence upon which the Board prosecutes
cases, and, therefore, it is the info rmation that will be most desirable in discovery. See NLRB v.
Robbins Tire & Rubber Co. Inc., 437 U.S. 214, 236 (1978). To allow this evidence to he disclosed in
deposition or any other device of discovery would be inconsistent with Robbins. Sre Bill Johnson's
Restaurants, Inc., 249 N.L.R.B. 155, 168 (1980); see also Brief for the NLRB at 28-29, Rill Johnson's.
112 The single exception to the general judicial approval of the Board's discovery rules among
the circuit courts is the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. See NLRB v. Rex Disposables, Division
of DUI] Industries, Inc., 494 F.2d 588, 591-93 (5th Cir. 1974); see also NLRB v. Safwa!,' Steel Scaffolds
Company of Georgia, 383 F.2d 273, 277-78 (5111 Cir. 1967); NLRB v. Miami Coca-Cola Bottling
Company, 403 F.2d 994, 995-97 (5th Cir. 1968).
1 " See Roger J. Au & Son v. NLRB, 538 F.2d 80, 83 (3d Cir. 1976); NLRB v. Valley Mold Co.,
Inc., 530 F.2d 693, 695 (6th Cir. 1976); D'Youville Manor, Lowell, Mass., inc. v. N LRB, 526 F.2d 3, 7
(1st Cir. 1975); NLRB v. Interboro Contractors, Inc., 432 F.2d 854, 858-60 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
402 U.S. 915 (1971); North American Rockwell Corp. v. NLRB, 389 F.2d 866, 871-74 (10th Cir.
1968); NLRB v. Vapor Blast Mfg. Co., 287 F.2d 402, 407-08 (7th Cir. 1961); NLRB v. Globe Wireless
Ltd., 193 F.2d 748, 751 (9th Cir. 1951).
'' NLRB v. Interboro Contractors, Inc., 432 F.2d. 854, 858 (2d Cir. 1970); see also Tide
Guarantee Co. v. NLRB, 534 F.2d 484, 487 (2d Cir. 1976); NLRB v. Lizdale Knitting Mills, Inc., 523
F2d 978, 980 (2d Cir. 1975).
432 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1970).
nc Id. at 855.
LIT Id. at 857-58.
c" Section 10(13) 1/1" the NLRA provides, in part:
Any such proceeding shall, so far as practicable, he conducted in accordance with the
rules of evidence applicable in the district courts of the United States under the rules of
civil procedure for the district courts of the United States, adopted by the Supreme
Court of the United States pursuant to section 2072 of title 28.
29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1982).
Id. at 859. The Second Circuit's position is consistent with the Board's interpretation. See
supra notes 33 -58 and accompanying text.
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Finding no legal requirement for requiring discovery, the appeals court endorsed the
Board's rationale for denying discovery, 12" Similarly, a majority of the remaining circuit
courts of appeals have held t hat, because the Board possesses the necessary rule-making
power, the decision regarding the circumstances under which discovery will be permitted
is a matter committed to the Board's discretion.' 21 Although sonic of these courts have not
gone so far as to praise the Board's restrictive policy, these courts have, nonetheless,
deferred to its rule-making discretion under the NI.RA. 122
The single exception to the general judicial approval of the Board's discovery rules
among the circuit courts is the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The Fifth Circuit
takes the position that so long as "good cause" is shown, the Board should permit
discovery to protect the rights of all part ies.' 23 Unlike the Second Circuit in biterboro, the
Fifth Circuit has interpreted section 10(13) 124 of the NLRA and the Board's rules as giving
the ALJ discretion to permit the taking of depositions. 125 hi National Labor Relations Board
v. Salway Steel Scaffolds Company of Georgia,' 26 the Board sought enforcement of an order
finding that a company had violated the NLRA by attempting to undermine it union and
refusing to bargain in good faith. 127 As part of its defense to the enforcement action, the
company claimed that it had been denied a fair hearing because its request fOr depositions
had been denied.'" The Fifth Circuit held that the AL] was wrong in asserting that there
was no pre-trial discovery in a Board proceeding-129 and stated that if discovery was
practicable, the Board's regulations and section 10(b) of the NLRA permitted discov-
ery. 13" The court found, however, that in the matter before it t he denial of' the motion for
leave to take depositions was a technical error that did not prejudice the company's
case. 12 ' Under the Fifth Circuit's interpretation, therefore, the ALJ's decision to permit
discovery is reviewable, and courts can require the Board to allow discovery if the Alj
abuses his discretion. 132 It is important to recognize, however, that even under the Fifth
Circuit's view, the discovery available to employers or unions is limited."' The Fifth
Circuit would permit discovery only under a device provided by the Board's rules, and
then, only if the employer or union can show "good cause." 134 Furthermore, as in Sqiyay
12" Irderboro, 432 F.2d at 858.
121 See Roger J. Au & Son v. NLRB, 538 F.2(1 80, 83 (3d Cir. 1976); NLRB v. Valley Mold Co.,
Inc., 530 F.2d 693, 695 (6th Cir. 1976); Electromec Design & Development Co. v. NLRB, 409 F.2d
631, 635 (9th Cir. 1969); North American Rockwell Corp. v, NLRB, 389 F.2d 866, 871-72 (10th Cir.
1968); NLRB v. Vapor Blast Mfg, Co., 287 F.2d 402, 407 (7th Cir. 1961).
122 See Electromec Design & Development Co. v. NLRB, 409 F.2d 631, 635 (9th Cir. 1969).
121
 NLRB v. Rex Disposables, Division of' D1-1,1 Industries, Inc., 494 F.2d 588, 592 (5th Cir.
1974).
' 14
 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1982). See supra note 118.
'" NLRB v. Safway Steel Scaffolds Company of Georgia, 383 F.2d 273, 276-77 (5th Cir. 1967).
The Second Circuit has interpreted the Board rule § 102.30 as a device to preserve evidence which is
not to he used for discovery. See Title Guarantee Co. v. NLRB, 534 F.2d 484, 487 (2d Cir. 1976).
1 " 383 17.2d 273 (5th Cir. 1967).
127 Id. :a 275-76.
128
 Id. at 276.
129 Id, at 277.
13"
 Id. at 276.
' 31 Id, at 277.
13 ' NLRB v. Rex Disposables, Division of DIA Industries, inc., 494 F.2d 588, 591-92 (5th Cir.
1974).
'" NLRB v. Schill Steel Products, Inc., 408 F.2d 803, 806 (5th Cir, 1969).
134
 See Rex Disposables, 494 F.2d at 592.
816	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 25:805
Steel, in the cases where the denial of discovery has been challenged, the error has never
been found to be so prejudicial as to require reversal of a Board decision. 13 ''
Despite the general judicial approval, the Board's denial of' pre-hearing discovery has
been widely criticized by commentators. 136
 Although these commentators recognize that
the Board cannot be legally compelled to adopt a more liberal discovery policy,'" they
argue that the Board's current position is too restrictive. 138
 Citing the example of federal
courts, these scholars point out that full discovery has been effective in eliminating
surprise,'" as well as in speeding up the trial process.'" Liberal discovery, it is argued,
could offer the same benefits to the Board's proceedings."' Although some of these
commentators recognize the unique vulnerability of employees,'" most assert that the
Board has given too much prOtection to employees' interest, and too little protection to
the employers' and unions' interests, in obtaining information about the unfair labor
practice charges brought against them.'" Consequently, these critics suggest that the
Board should reassess its restrictive discovery rules in order to protect more adequately
the rights of employers and unions.
Recognizing the validity of some of this criticism, it remains the Board's difficult
responsibility to execute its statutory mandate while at the same time striking a balance in
its proceedings. 144
 Discovery in labor disputes involves the conflicting need to safeguard
employees in the pursuit of their statutory rights, and the need to provide adequate
information so employers and unions CM prepare their defenses. "5
 The Board takes the
135 Noic, NLRB Discovery After Robbins: More Peril For Private Litigants, 47 FoRinIAM L. Rev. 393,
410 (1978); sec also NLRB v. Rex Disposables, Division of DI-1J Industries, Inc., 494 E.2d 588, 593
(5th Cir, 1974); NLRB v. Salway Steel Scaffolds Company of Georgia, 383 F.2d 273, 277 (5th Cir.
1967); NLRB v. Miami Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 403 F.2d 994, 996 (5th Cir. 1968).
136
 See Berger, Discovery in Administrative Proceedings, 12 An. 1.. REV. 28, 32 (1959) ]hereinafter
cited as Berger]; Cox, Adherence to the Rules of Evidence and the Federal Rules orCivil Procedure as a Means
of Expediting Proceedings, 12 Air. L. Rev. 51, 155 (1959); Davis, Revising the Administrative Procedure Act,
29 An. I.. Rev. 35, 44 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Davis]; Gallagher, Use of Pre-Trial Discovery as Means
(y-
 Overcoming Undue and Unnecessary Delay in Administrative Proceedings, 12 Au. L. REV. 44, 47 (1959)
[hereinafter Cited as Gallagher]; Garvey, Prehearing Discovery in NLRB Proceedings. 26 LAII. I,. J. 710,
718 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Garvey]; Getman & Goldberg, 7'he Myth of Labor Board Expertise, 39 U.
Cm. L. REV. 681, 682-7 (1972); Howard. Discovery Before the National Labor Relations Board —
Unexploded Concept, 12 S. Tex. l„ J. 112 (1970); Kaufman, Have Administrative Agencies Kept Pace with
Modern OM i.t-Devei aped Tech whines Against Delay? judge's View, 12 An. L. REV, 103, I 18 (1959-60);
Morris, The Case far Urrrtrrry Enforcement of Federal Labor Law —Concerning a Specialized Article III Court
and tire Reorganization of Existing Agencies, 26 Sw. L. J. 471, 486 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Morris];
Tomlinson, Discovery in Agency Adjudication, 1971 I)ijL. J. 89, 100 (1971); Note. NLRB Discovery
After Robbins: More Peril For Private Litigants, 47 FoRimANI L. Rev. 393, 417 (1978) [hereinafter cited
as Note, NLRB Discovery After Robbins]; Comment „ArLIIII Discovery Practice: The Applicability of the
Discovery Provision of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 1976 B. Y. U. L. Rev. 845, 858-64 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Comment, A7,1l13 Discovery Practice].
331 See Davis, super{ note 136, at 44-45.
138 See supra note 136.
138 See Berger, .supra note 136, at 32. Berger argues that discovery in labor proceedings are
one-sided because the Board has investigative powers and the authority to subpeona. Id.
14" See Morris, supra note 136, at 482; Gallagher, supra MAC 136, at 47.
141 See .yripra notes 139-40.
'42 Cnrninerst, NLRB Discovery Practice, .supra note 136, at 864.
11 ' Note, NLRB Discovery After Robbins, supra note 136, at 406; Comment, NLRB Discovery
Practice, supra note 136, at 858-64.
1" See Manoli & Joseph, The National Labor Relations Hoard and Discovery Procedures, 18 An. L.
Rev. 9, 11 (1966).
145 See supra notes 80-86.
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position that the balance it has struck in favor (if limiting discovery is equitable.'"
Furthermore, the judiciary has, for the most part, unequivocally supported this position.
As a result, however, both employers and unions have historically sought to circumvent
the Board's discovery prohibition in search of additional pre-hearing inf on -nation.' 47
II. DEVICES USED TO CIRCUNIVEN"1"I'LIE ROARD'S DISCOVERY RULES
A. The Use of Board Procedural Rules mid Suds iu Federal District Court
Dissatisfied with the Board's restrictive rules, and eager to obtaM inf on -nation, em-
ployers arid unions have used a number -of devices and tactics to gain additional pre-
hearing discovery .' 48 Because the Board's agents investigate all unfair labor practice
charges and the employees themselves have little physical evidence,'" respondents to a
Board complaint are generally seeking information possessed by the Board.'." One way
employers and unions have sought to obtain information is through devices available
under the Board's rules.'" Bills of particulars, permitted under the Board's rules to
clarify the corn plaint,'" have been used to request the names of witnesses and the nature
of their testimony's':' Subpoenas have been employed to compel the General Counsel to
disclose any and all evidence inconsistent with the evidence presented at the hearing.'"
Depositions, allowed under the Board's rules for the purpose of preserving evidence for
the hearing,' 55 have been sought for general discovery purposes.' The Board has
consistently and successfully' resisted such attempts asserting that its rules and regulations
allowing such procedures are available only to provide employers and unions with the
infOrmation they need to receive a fa ir hearing. In addition the Board maintains that its
rules are not intended to provide the full discovery available in in civil suit.' 57
Another lactic used by respondents to obtain discovery was to sue the Board in
federal district court.' These suits fell into two general categories.'" The first category
involved suits brought by respondents in Board proceedings seeking to enjoin rite Board
action until their requested information was made available.'" Plaintiffs in these actions
relied upon a theory that the Board's denial of discovery exceeded its statutory author-
ity."' The circuit courts. however, have uniformly held tha«list rid courts lack jurisdic-
I" See Mid-West Paper Products Co., 223 N.L.R.B. 1367, 1376 (1976). Sc., also supm note 84.
"7 See iitfra notes 148-68 and accompanying text.
' 48 Note, NLRB Discoven. After Robbins, supra note 136, at 394; Comment, NLRB DiArovoy
Practice _supra note 136, at 856.
118 2 THE DEvEt.oPtsc: LABOR LAW, .supra note 3, at 1617,
' 5" See NLRB v. Robbins Tire Sc Rubber Co.. 437 U.S. 214, 236 (1978).
131 See North American Rockwell Corp. v. NLRB, 389 F.2d 866, 871-74 (10th Cir. 1968).
' 5) Sue .sultru note 46 ;Lind accompanying text,
' 53 See Plumbers and Steamfitters Union Local 100, 128 N.L.R.B. 398, 400 (1960), eryiduced per
curium, 291 F.2d 927 (5th Cir. 1961): see also North American Rockwell v- ,NLRB, 389 F.2d 866, 871
(10th Cir. 1968).
'" North American Rockwell v. NLRB, 389 F.2d 866, 873 (10411 Cir. 1968).
' 55 See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text,
151' See NLRB v. Interboro Contractors, Inc., 432 F.2(1 854, 858 (2d Cir. 1970).
157 14.
158 See Robbins, 437 U.S. at 217 (EC)1A suit); McClain, Industries, Inc. v. NLRB, 381 F. Stipp. 187,
188-89 (E.D. Mich. 1974) (injunctive suit).
' 5" See supra note 158.
""' Sep Vapor Blast NiN- . Co. v. Madden, 280 F.2d 205, 206 (7th Cir. 1960); McClain Industries,
Inc., 381 F. Supp. 187, 188-89 (E.D. Mich. 1974).
1 " McClain I norusiries, 381 F. Supp at 189.
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lion In hear requests for such injunctions.' 62 Suits involving FO1A actions brought against
the Board constituted the second, and much larger category.' Since the passage of the
FOIA in 1967, respondents in Board proceedings have attempted to use its prOvisions to
obtain witness statements and other information.'" In its petition for certiorari to the
United States Supreme Court in NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., the Board predicted
that if employers and unions could successfully use the FO1A as a method of' discovery,
pre-hearing requests for witnesses' statements under the FOIA would be made in vir-
tually all unfair labor practice actions. 165
 Although the Supreme Court's decision in
Robbins eliminated the use of FOIA as a discovery device,'" thereby terminating this
method of circumventing the Board's discovery procedures,' 67 the Court's decision in Bill
Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB has opened a new avenue of "back door - discovery
through which employers and unions may be able to circumvent the Board's restrictive
discovery procedures.' 68
B. The Use of Stale Court Actions For Discover). Purposes
In Bill Johnson's, I he Board recognized that state court suits brought by employers or
unions against employees after the employees have filed charges with the Board can be
used to bypass the Board's limited discovery procedures.'" State courts generally provide
liberal discovery procedures that are similar to the discovery provisions of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.' Because these civil suits can involve the same labor dispute
that gave rise to the unfair labor practice charge,'" there is significant potential that
factual issues will overlap.' 72 Under the guise of obtaining information for the slate court
action employers and unions can use the more lenient state court discovery procedures to
obtain information that is really related to the Board's proceedings. 173 To maintain its
discovery procedures and to protect employees from intimidation, it had been the Board's
fez
	 Industries, Inc_ v. NLRB, 521 F.2d 596, 597 (6th Cir. 1974); NLRB v. Vapor Blast
Mfg. Co., 280 F.2d 205, 208 (7th Cir. 1961); see also In re NLRB (Grey Concrete Products, Inc.), 109
L.R.R,M, 3203, 3204 (11111 Cir. 1982)-
1 N3 See Robbins, 437 U.S. al 219 n.5.
16  See Carvcy,Nupra note 136, at 710; Comment ,Nir.,/03 Discovery Practice ,supra note 136, at 856.
1" Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 9,
Robbins.
'" See Robbins, 437 U.S. at 242 -43.
167 See id. at 237.
'68 See Bill Johnson's, 249 N.1...R.B. at 166 (1980).
166 Id.
' 7" See Wright, Procedural Reform in the Slates, 24 F.R.D. 85, 86 -88 (1959); Developments in the Law
— Discovery, 74 HA RV. 1,. REV, 940, 950 (1961); see also supra note 66.
' 7 ' See Sheet Metal Workers' Union Local 355, 254 N.L.R.B. 773, 779 (1981),n/forced in part and
enforcement denied in part, 716 F.2d 1249 (1983); The United Credit Bureau of America, Inc., 242
N.L.R.B. 921, 926 (1979), enforced, 643 F.2d 1017 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 994 (1981);
George A, Angle, 242 N.L.R.B. 744, 746 (1979), enforced, 683 F.2d 1296 (10th Cir. 1982); Power
Systems, Inc., 239 N.L.R.B. 445, 447 (1978), enforcement denied, 601 F.2d 936 (7th Cir. 1979).
172
	
Sheet Metal Workers Union Local 355 v. NLRB, 716 F.2d 1249 (9th Cir. 1983).
113 Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc., 249 N.L.R.B. 155, 166 -67 (1980). The ALJ in Bill Johnson's
stated: "Respondents' utilization of Arizona's libel [sic) discovery rules to obtain the depositions of its
employees in furtherance of a separate state action effectively allows the Respondent to bypass the
Board's established procedures and obtain through the back door evidence which was closely
associated with the issues in the pending Board hearing. - Id. at 166.
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practice to order frivolous'" state court actions brought for retaliatory purposes enjoined
on the grounds that the suits were unfair labor practices. 15
Section 8(a)(4) of the NLRA makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer "to
discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee because he has filed charges or
given testimony" under the NLRA. 176 To enforce this provision the Board closely
scrutinizes civil lawsuits brought by employers or unions against employees who have
previously filed charges with the Board.'" Although the Board has fluctuated on the
question of whether the filing of a civil action after an employee has brought an unfair
labor practice charge is a per se violation of section 8(a)(4), 1 " its general rule has been that
such lawsuits, by themselves, do not constitute an unfair labor practice." 9 In Clyde
Taylor,'" the Board found that an employer violated the NLRA by threatening to file a
libel action in state court against employees in retaliation for their filing charges with the
Board.'" The Board refused, however, to find that the same employer had violated the
NLRA by obtaining a state court injunction banning employee picketing.'" The Board
reasoned that its enforcement of the NLRA should "accommodate" the rights of parties to
litigate their claims in state court.'"
Pursuant to the Clyde Taylor doctrine, the Board has been reluctant to find t hat either
employers or unions violate the NLRA simply by bringing a civil lawsuit subsequent to the
filing of an unfair labor practice charge against them.'" The Board has carved out an
exception to the Clyde Tailor rule to reach situations where a civil lawsuit has been brought
for an unlawful purpose.'" Under this exception, the Board has ordered suits enjoined
174 This note's primary focus is on frivolous or baseless lawsuits brought for the purpose of
circumventing the Board's restrictive discovery rules. The problem of meritorious lawsuits, which are
only brought for discovery purposes, involve a complicated preemption issue. For a discussion of this
problem, see infra notes 292, 357.
'" See Bill Johnson's, 249 N.L.R.B. at 168; see also Power Systerm, 239 N.L.R.B. at 450.
'n 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4) (1982).
"7 See Sheet ,Vietal, 254 N.L.R.B. at 779.
"8 See W.T. Carter & Brother, 90 N.L.R.B. 2020 (1950). In Carter, a divided Board held that it
was unfair labor action to bring a civil action to enjoin a union from holding organizational meetings
in a Company town. Id. at 2023. The Board likened the suit to an abuse of process which was brought
in had faith. Id, at 2024. This case was subsequently overruled by the Board in Clyde Taylor, 127
N.L.R.B. 103, 109 (1960).
"9 See 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 3, at 135; see also S. E. Nichols Macy Corp., 229
N.L.R.B. 75 (1977); Frank Visceglia, 203 N.L.R.B. 265, 266-67 (1973), enforcement denied, 498 F.2d
43, 50 (3d Cir. 1974); United Aircraft Corp., 192 N.1„R.B. 382, 384 (1971), enfiocerl in part, 534 F.2d
422, 465 (2c1 Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 825 (1976); Clyde Taylor, 127 N.L.R.B. 103, 109 (1960);
Brief for NLRB at 13, Bill Johnson's.
'" 127 N.L.R.B. 103 (1960).
Id. at 108.
191 Id. at 109.
tea
194 See United Credit Bureau, 643 F.2d at 1022-23; see also Sullivan and Associates, 230 N.L.R.B.
55 (1975); S,E. Nichols Macy Corp., 229 N.L.R.B, 75 (1977); Retail Clerks Union Local No. 770, 218
N.L.R.B. 680, 683 (1975); Los Angeles Building and Construction Trades Council, AFL-C10, 217
N.L.R.B. 946, 948 (1975); Frank Visceglia, 203 N.L.R.B. 265, 266-67 (1973); United Aircraft Corp.,
192 N.L.R.B. 382, 384 (1971).
1" See Power Systems, Inc., 239 N.L.R.B. 445, 449 (1978), enforcement denied, 601 F.2d 936, 940
(7th Cir. 1979); United Standford Employees, Local 680, 232 N.L.R.B. 326 (1977); Television
Wisconsin, Inc., 224 N.L.R.B. 722, 778-80 (1976); International Organization of Masters, Mates and
Pilots, 224 N.L.R.B. 1626, 1627 (1976), arr.!, 575 F.2d 896, 907 (D.C. Cir. 1978); West Point
Pepperell, Inc., 200 N.L.R.B. 1031 (1972); see also I T/IE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW,SUpra note 3, at 135.
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that it determines to have been brought either to punish the employee,'" lir to bypass the
Board's discovery
The Board first announced its exception to the Clyde Tailor doctrine in Power Sv.cions
tR8
 In that decision the Board !Mind that an employer had violated sections 8(a)(1) and
(4) of the NI..,RA by filing a state court action against its former employee,'" The
employer alleged that the employee had Maliciously filed a meritless charge with the
Board.'y0 Finding that the employee had probable cause for filing the charge, and that the
evidence 111)011 which the employer had relied was insufficient 10 support its claim,'" the
Board concluded that the employer's suit had no "reasonable basis.' 2 Consequently, the
Board reasoned that the in could only have been brought fOr the illegal purpose of
penalizing the employee,'" The Board pointed out that the immediate cost of hiring
counsel to defend the civil suit, along with the threat of substantial damages, economically
punished the employee.'" Moreover, the Board recognized that retaliatory civil suits had
the effect of discouraging other employees from seeking access to the Board's process."'
In Power Sisleuo and the Board decisions that have followed this exception to the
Clyde Tailor- rule,'" the Board's primary concern was the retaliatory nature of the state
court action.'" Although the Board used the lack of reasonable basis in the civil suit as the
grounds fm- ordering such suits enjoined, the determination of I he lack of basis of such
suits was only I he means by which the Board ascertained whether such it retaliatory
purpose existed. E98 let effect an unlawful retaliatory purpose could he inferred by a lack of
i" Power Systems, Inc., 239 N.1„R.R. 445, 450 (1978), epyimcement denied. 601 F.2d 936, 940 (7th
Cir. 1979).
'" Bill Johtmon's, 249 N.L. R. B. at 169.




' 9° Id. at 447. The employee had filed 46 unfair labor practice charges since 1967 although only
one charge had been filed against the employer in this case. Id. at 446. Twenty-seven of the charges
had been withdrawn, thirteen dismissed, four settled, arid two led to Board orders. Id.
Id. at 448-49.
192 Id. at 449.
193 Id. at 450,
' 94 Id.
'" Id. The Seventh Circuit did not enforce the Board's decision on appeal because it Mund a
lack of substantial evidence to support the Board's holding. Power Systems, Inc. v. NLRB, 601 F.2d
936, 939-40 (7th Cir. 1979). This reversal, however, has not been viewed as discrediting the Board's
rationale, and the case has been interpreted as establishing a general rule. See United Credit Bureau,
643 F.2d at 1023.
'" The Board viewed its decision in Power System's as an exception to the Cifyde Taylor doctrine. See
Power Systems, 239 N.L.R.B. at 449. The Supreme Court has argued, however, that Power SyitemA was
not really an exception, but effectively overruled Clyde Tailor. See Bill Johnson's, 103 S. Ct. at 2168.
' 97 Bill John8on7c, 103 S. CA. at 2168.
1 " The Supreme Court interpreted the Board's Power Systems rule as lint regarding lack of merit
in the employer's or union's suit "as an independent element. - Billlohnson, 103 S. Cr. at 2168. In the
Board's decision in Bill Johnson's, and the four prior Board decisions under its Power Systems rule,
however, the Board had concluded that the suits were retaliatory because the state court suits were
baseless. See Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc., 249 N.L.R.B. 155, 165 (1980); Sheet Metal Workers'
Union Local 355, 254 N.1..R.B. 773, 780 (1981), enforced in part and enforcement denied in par 4', 716 F.2d
1249 (1983); George A. Angle, 242 N.L.R.B. 744, 747 (1979), enfnrced, 683 F.2d 1296 (10th Cir.
1982); The United Credit Bureau of America, Inc., 242 N.L.R.B. 921, 926 (1979), enforced, (343 F.2d
1017 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 994 (1981); Power Systems, Inc., 239 N.L.R.B, 445, 449-5(1
(1978), enforeconcid denied, 601 F.2d 936 (7th Cir. 1979). Nevertheless, despite the Board's finding that
these suits were baseless, the Supreme Court's interpretation seems reasonable in light of' t he fact that
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reasonable basis in the employer's or union's suit. The Board argued that retaliatory suits
violated the NLRA because these suits were "inherently coercive," 1" and discouraged
employees from filing charges."' In addition to the general retaliatory effect of such
lawsuits, the Board also recognized that these suits enabled the parties to use state court
discovery to further intimidate and coerce an employee."' Accordingly, the Board ar-
gued that civil suits brought for the purpose of circumventing its discovery rules were
unfair labor practices. 202 Although the retaliatory suit and the 'abuse of discovery can
constitute separate unfair labor practices," 3 they are related in that the use of state court
discovery is unlawful only if the state court action is retaliatory.'" To prevent the abuse of
discovery, therefore, the Board must first be able to enjoin the state court action. Prior to
the Supreme Court's decision in Bill Johnson's, the Board was able to enjoin a state suit
whenever it determined that the civil suit was brought For a retaliatory purpose. 203
III. THE PROCEDURA I. EFFECT OF BILL JOHNSON'S
A. A New Standard For Enjoining Retaliatory Snits
In Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, the Supreme Court established a new
standard the Board must use in determining whether an action brought in stale court
subsequent to the filing of an unfair labor practice claim is unlawful. This standard limits
the Board's ability to order an employer or union to halt a state court. suit. 20" The Bill
Johnson's decision could create a loophole that will enable employers and unions to
side-step the Board's discovery rules. 2"/
The complaining party in Bill Johnson's, Ruth Helton, was suddenly fired after
working for over six years as a waitress at Bill Johnson's Big Apple East Restaurant.'" On
August 9, 1978, the day alter her discharge, Helton filed an unfair labor practice charge
with the Board alleging that she had been fired because of her efforts to organize a
union."' After an investigation, the Board issued a complaint. 210 At the same time, Helton
in all these cases the overall emphasis was on the retaliatory motive and not the merits of the civil suit.
In addition, in oral argument before the Supreme Court in Bill Johnson's, the Board's counsel would
not rule out the possibility that prosecution of a meritorious retaliatory suit might be found to be an
unfair labor practice. See Bill Johnson's, 103 S. Ct. at 2168 n.8.
1" Sheet Metal Workers' Union Local 355, 254 N.L.R.B. 773, 780 (1981).
2" See George A. Angle, 242 N.L.R.B. 744, 749 (1978), e qitrced, 683 F,2d 1296 (10th Cir. 1982);
United Credit Bureau of America, Inc,, 242 N.L.R.B. 921, 927 (1979), erthrced, 643 F.2d 1017 (4th
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 994 (1981); Power Systems, Inc., 239 N.L.R.B, 445, 450, ettforcemetzt
denied, 601 F.2d 936, 940 (7th Cir. 1979).
20 ' See Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc., 249 N.L.R.B. 155, 165-68 (1980).
"2 See id. at 169.
Y°.9
2°4 See infra notes 261-64 and accompanying text.
2" See supra notes 196-200 and accompanying text.
200 Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 103 S. Ct. 2161, 2171 - 73 (1983).
''"? Hill le-Austin's, 249 N.L.R.B. at 165 -68.
208 Id, at 157 -58.
209 Id. at 158. Helton and other waitresses had considered Forming a union since 1975. Id. at 157.
Concerted efforts were only undertaken, however, in react ion to a meeting held by management on
July 25, 1978. Id. At that meeting, management had announced a new policy of strict enforcement of
company rules and told the waitresses that they had little jot) security as "they were not worth a dime
a dozen, - and could be easily replaced. Id.
RIO Id.
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and three co-workers began picketing the restaurant and distributing leaflets explaining
their various grievances. 2" On September 25, 1978, the restaurant filed a civil complaint
in state court against Helton and the other picketers. 212 The civil suit alleged that the
defendants had harassed customers, blocked access to the restaurant, created a threat to
public safety, and libeled the restaurant and its management with false statements in the
leaflets. 213 At the time the restaurant filed its complaint, it obtained an order to expedite
depositions."' On October 2, 1978, the attorneys for the restaurant deposed Helton,
asking numerous questions about her union activities and the unfair labor practice charge
she had brought against the restaurant. 215 Meanwhile, the day after the civil suit was
initiated, Helton filed a second charge with the Board alleging that the restaurant had
committed a number of additional unfair labor practices in connection with the labor
dispute between the waitresses and the restaurant. 216 Among the unfair labor practices
alleged in the second complaint, Helton claimed that the restaurant's civil suit was
brought in retaliation for her filing charges under the NLRA. 2 " The General Counsel
issued a complaint based on these charges on October 23, 1978.219
After a consolidated hearing on the two unfair labor practice complaints, an adminis-
trative law judge held that the restaurant had committed six unfair labor practices during
the dispute. 219 Applying the rationale expressed in Power Systems, the AU concluded that
2" Id. at 161. The leaflets stated:
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD HAS 1SSUED A COMPLAINT
AGAINST THE BIG APPLE RESTAURANT, 3757 E. VAN BUREN STREET, FOR
UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES.
The complaint was issued as a result of charges filed by Myriand Helton, a former
employee who was fired August 8 after suggesting to other waitresses they should
organize a union. Mrs. Helton had been an employee of the Big Apple seven and one
half years.
Several other waitresses have quit their jobs to join Mrs. Helton in picketing the
restaurant to inform the public of the dispute between the employees and the restaur-
ant's management. Among the waitresses' complaints are the following:
Eight hour shifts with no specified breaks.
No pay for overtime when waitresses were required to remain at their posts until
their last customer's check had been paid.




A filthy restroom for women employees, with no soap, paper towels, or toilet tissue
provided.
EMPLOYEES OF BILL JOHNSON'S BIG APPLE FOR JUSTICE ON THE JQB.
at 162.
"2 Id.
213 Id. The complaint sought $500,000 in damages and an injunction preventing the defendants
from picketing. /d. On November 13, 1978, the defendants filed a counterclaim in the state court
alleging abuse of process, malicious prosecution, and libel. Bill Johnson's 103 S. Ct. at 2166 n.2. The
parties then cross-motioned for summary judgment, and the state court dismissed all claims except
the libel claims, which it left for trial. Id.
214
	Johnson's, 249 N,LR,B. at 163.
215 Id. See infra notes 261 - 72 and accompanying text.
2j6 Bill Johnson's, 103 S. Ct. at 2165-66.
217
 Id. at 2165.
2IS
2 " Although the Supreme Court stated that the AL] found seven unfair labor practices, id. at
2166, the ALJ actually found six, and the Board amended that finding to include a seventh. See Bill
Johnson's, 249 N.L.R.B. at 155. The ALJ held:
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"on the basis of the record and from [his] observation of the witnesses," the state court
action lacked a reasonable basis, and its prosecution was, therefore, retaliatory. 220
 On
appeal, the Board adopted, with minor exceptions, 22 ' the ALJ's decision and ordered,
inter elfin, the restaurant to withdraw its state court compkinn.222
 The United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit enforced the Board's order in its entirety 223
 Observing
that the case "involved a delicate balance between federal and Kate interests,
- the appeals
court ruled that the Board's power to enforce the NI...RA would he "largely crippled if' it
could not order the withdrawal of retaliatory lawsuits. -224
 'l'he United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari to consider the Board's order enjoining the state court aciion. 225
The Supreme Court held that the Board could not order the restaurant to refrain
from prosecuting its state court suit, regardless of the restaurant's mot i n es, unless the suit
also lacked a reasonable basis in fact and law."' The Court stated that retaliatory motive,
by itself, was insufficient grounds for the Board to halt a state court act ion. 2" Although
the Court recognized that the Board has substantial remedial powers under the NI_RA, 228
and that a civil lawsuit could be used for coercive or retaliatory purposes. 220
 it concluded
that the constitution required that a higher criterion be met before a civil suit could be
enjoined. 23° The Court determined that employers' and unions' first amendment right of
access to the courts, as well as the states' compelling concern in providing a civil remedy
for conduct affecting interests "deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility,• 23 '
demanded that the Board find berth a retaliatory motive and a lack of reasonable basis
before it orders a state suit enjoined. 232
1) The restaurant had violated § 8(a)(1) and (3) by discharging Helton because of her union
activities. Id. at 168.
2) & 3) The restaurant had twice violated § 8(a)(1) and (4) by threatening the picketers with
reprisals. Id. at 169.
4) The employer had violated § 8(a)(1) and (4) by initiating the lawsuit in order to penalize
Helton for filing the unfair labor practice charges. Id.
5) The restaurant had violated § 8(i)(1) and (4) by deposing Helton concerning the subject of
the pending unfair labor practice proceeding under coercive circumstances, and lOr the purpose of
circumventing the Board's discovery rules. Id.
6) The restaurant violated 1 8(a)(1) and (4) when it interrogated another waitress, without full
consent, about the pending unrair labor practice proceeding. hi.
The Board subsequently amended the AL's finding (6), concluding that the restaurant had
violated the NI.,RA a second time by interrogating the waitress a second time. Id. at 155.
220
 Rill Johnson's, 249 N. L. R. B. at 164.
221 Id. at 155. See supra note 219.
222 Id. at 170.
223
 Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 660 F.2d 1335, 1344 (9th Or. 1981).
224 a
225
 Bill Johnson's Restaurants, inc. v. NLRB, 103 S. Ct. 2161, 2167 (1983). The Court spe-
cifically did not consider the question or the restaurant's attempt to circumvent the Board's discovery
rules, or the Board's ruling on this issue. Id. at 2167 n.4.
226 Id. at 2173. The Supreme Court chose to adopt the Board's terminology of "rational basis, -
but limited the Board's authority to determine only whether such a basis exists, and not the actual
factual or legal elements of the basis. Id. at 2172 -73.
227 Id. at 2173.
226 Id. at 2168.
222 /d. at 2169.
230 Id.
231 Id.
222 Id. at 2173. Although the Al.) had held that the civil lawsuit lacked a reasonable basis, the
Court interpreted the Board's standard rot- ordering the state court actions enjoined as essentially
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In holding that a meritorious suit, whatever the motive for its filing and prosecution,
does not violate the NLRA, the Court emphasized that its conclusion was constitutionally
based. 233 The Court stated that a baseless claim is not protected by the first amendment.'"
Similarly, the Court explained that a state's interest in providing a civil remedy for its
citizens does not exist in actions that have no merit . 235 The Court, therefore, also held that
it is an enjoinable violation of the NLRA for employers or unions to prosecute baseless
lawsuits with the intent of retaliating against an employee for filing- charges with the
Board. 23"
Although concluding that a baseless lawsuit brought for a retaliatory purpose violates
the N1_,K A, the Bill johnsenis Court established a strict standard to guide the Board's
determination of the requisite lack of a reasonable basis. 237 The Court held that the
constitutional rights of a civil litigant and the state's interest in protecting the health and
welfare of its citizens required a narrow standard under which the Board is prohibited
front determining genuine issues of' material fact or issues of state law. 23" The Court,
therefore, suggested that the Board look to the summary judgement and directed verdict
tems223 as it way of determining whether the civil lawsuit raises either a genuine issue of'
material fact that turns on the credibility of witnesses, 24° or an issue of state law."' If
either exists, the Board has no authority to make findings concerning them. 242
 Instead, it
must halt the retaliatory unfair labor practice action and allow the state court suit to
proceed:24" Thus, although the Board's reasonable basis inquiry is riot limited to the bare
pleadings,' the Board can only determine whether there is a reasonable basis for a civil
suit where the facts are undisputed and the suit deals with established questions of state
law.'" As the civil suit in Bit/ Johnson's involved disputed facts, 24" the Court held that the
ALJ had erred by making factual findings and not limiting his inquiry to whether any'
factual issues existed. 247 The Court, therefore, vacated and remanded the case to the
Board so that it could consider the reasonable basis of the employer's suit in light of the
Court's new standard. 24 "
In a concurring opinion, Justice Brennan stressed that the Court's new reasonable
basis standard must be interpreted in light of the basic federalistic structure governing
focused on the retaliatory motivation and not the merits of the suit. Id. at 2168; see supra notes
197-98. The Court, therefore, established a new standard that the Board must apply to determine





232 Id. at 2171.
237 Id. at 2171-73.
"a Id. at 2171 - 72.
235 Id, at 2171 n.11. The Court staled that these tests are almost identical and should be granted
"when the evidence is such that without weighing the credibility of the witnesses, there can be but one
reasonable conclusion as to the verdict." Id.
245 Id.
241 Ide
242 Id. at 2171-72.
243 Id.
244 Id. at 2171.
243
	 at 2171-72,
"" Id. at 2173.
247 Id .
245
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labor disputes. 249
 Consequently, Justice Brennan pointed out that the Court's decision in
Bill Johnson's did not affect the Board's aut horny to enjoin state court actions that involved
issues preempted by federal law. 25" In addition, Justice Brennan observed that the Court's
authority to determine the scope of the Board's inquiry in an unfair labor practice
hearing was limited by principles of administrative law. 251
 Accordingly, Justice Brennan
stated that absent a constitutional violation, the Board was free to use any procedural
method it deemed appropriate in making its reasonable basis determination. 252
Billjohnson's establishes the rule that absent preemption the Board must find both a
retaliatory motive and a lack of reasonable basis before ordering an employer or union to
cease prosecuting a state court action. In addition, the Board is prohibited front deciding
genuine issues of material fact or issues of state law in evaluating the basis of state court
suits. Under this new standard, therefore, the Board can no longer focus its inquiry on
the retaliatory motive. instead the Board must consider the merits of the state court suit
independently. Such a standard, however, will restrict the Board's ability to halt retalia-
tory civil suits and the abuses of discovery that can accompany these suits.
13. The Impact of the Bill Johnson's Standard on the Board's Discovery Procedures
An employer's or union's first amendment right of access to state courts together with
the state's interest in providing a civil remedy for internal disputes are compelling
considerations that must be weighed in any decision to enjoin a state court proceeding as
an unfair labor practice:253
 To focus primarily on retaliatory motivation, 254
 as had been
the Board's prior practice, involves the constitutional danger of denying legitimate state
court claims. 255
 The Supreme Court, therefore, was correct in requiring that the Board
find both a retaliatory motive and no reasonable basis before ordering an employer or
union to halt a civil lawsuit. 256
 Nevertheless, in establishing the standard by which the
Board is to determine whether the suit has a reasonable basis, the Court has restricted the
Board's authority to control labor disputes properly within the Board's jurisdiction. 257
The Bill Johnson's standard creates a problem because the Supreme Court, in an eftOrt to
protect the employer's or union's constitutional rights, has limited the Board's ability to
make factual and legal determinations affecting the stale - court action.'" This limiting
standard will have the practical effect of curtailing the Board's ability to halt state court
suits brought for illegal purposes. 259
 Consequently, an employer or union will be able to
249 See id. at 2174 (Brennan, J., concurring).
25° Id. at 2176 (Brennan, J., concurring).
251 11 (Brennan, J., concurring).
252 Id. at 2177 (Brennan, J., concurring).
253 Id, at 2169.
224 Set! .supra note 198.
252
 See Bill Johnson's, 103 S. Ct. at 2169.
256 hi. at 2173. See also infra note 302 and accompanying text.
257
	 restriction has a two-fold nature. The first involves the procedural effect on the Board's
discovery rules. The second involves the Board's authority to make substantive legal determinations.
See infra note 289.
' As the Supreme Court recognized in Bill Johnson's, if the Board can make determinations of
witnesses' credibility, it will, in effect, be deciding the merits of the slate court action. Rill Johnson's,
103 S. Ct. at 2171-72.
239 If the Board is prohibited from determining genuine issues of material fact or law involved
in a state suit, the majority of retaliatory lawsuits will not he enjoinable. For example, of the five
Board decisions under the Power Systems rule in which an employer or union was ordered to desist
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bring a state court action and utilize state court discovery as a means of circumventing the
Board's restrictive discovery rules, and, tinder the Bill Johnson's standard, the Board may
he precluded from stopping this abuse.'"
This problem is best illustrated by the facts that gave rise to the labor dispute in
Johnson's. Upon filing its complaint in state court, the employer immediately moved to
shorten the statutory t hue for taking depositions. 261 The state court granted this motion,
and within a week from the filing of the state court complaint, the employer's attorneys
began deposing Helton and other employees."' The employees' attorney filed a motion to
preclude discovery of matters relevant to the pending unfair labor practice proceeding
until after the Board's hearing, arguing that the Board's rules do not permit discovery." 3
The state court initially denied this motion; however•, it later modified its ruling to
preclude questions about employee statements made to Board investigators.'" Neverthe-
less, the stale court continued to permit discovery into overlapping substantive issues. 285
Despite the limiting slate court order, therefore, the employer's attorneys, in taking
depositions, asked numerous questions regarding the nature and extent of Helton's
union activities, the identities of other employees involved in such activities, and the
extent of' management's knowledge of' these activities.'" All of these matters related to the
employer's defense in the pending Board action."' The employer's attorneys, having
obtained t he names of other employees who had been involved with Helton in organizing
the union, also used this information to unlawfully interrogate another employee. 268
At the unfair labor practice hearing, the Al.j concluded that the employer's use of
state court discovery to explore matters intimately connected with the Board's action, but
only tangentially associated with the state suit, was a sufficient basis to find that one of the
employer's purposes for bringing the suit was to bypass the Board's established discovery
proceclures."9 To maintain control over the Boards procedures, therefore, the AL .J held
front prosecuting a state action, only one decision was based on a summary judgment rationale which
might be upheld under t he Bill Johnson's standards. See George A. Angle, 242 N.L.R.B. 747, 748 n.13
(1979) ,S PP also supra note 198. In the other four decisions, the ALJ and/or Board made determina-
tions of material issues. See Sheet Metal, 254 N.L.R.B. at 778 -80, enforced in part and enArcement denied
in part, 716 1.- .2d 1249 (9th Cir. 1983). (The Ninth Circuit's decision applied the Supreme Court's Rill
Johnson's standard); Bill Johnson's, 249 N.L.R.B. at 164; United Credit B 7u -eau, 242 N.L.R.B. at 925-26;
Power Systems, 239 N.L.R.B. at 447-50.
2 "e See Brief for the National Labor Relations Board at 29, Bill Johnson's, "Flue lit iard's counsel
stated: -Thus, if an employer may pursue insubstantial litigation in state court in retaliation for im
employee's filing of unfair labor practice charges, it could, through the use of state court discovery
procedures, achieve the same deleterious result that the Court sought to avoid in Robbins. - Id,




265 The employer's ittorney was thus allowed to ask questions "'regarding the statements made
publicly [by Helton and other employees] in NI uricopa County, and the basis for those statements.'
Id. Since the leaflets which Helton and the other employees had distributed publicly accused the
employer of discharging Helton because of her union activities (the basis of pending unfair labor
practice charge) the state court's order had the effect of allowing the employer's attorneys to
circumvent the Board's restrictive discovery rules. Id. at 162.
'" Id. at 163.
287 Id.
286 id,
269 Id. This finding was not considered by the Supreme Court in its review. See Bill Johnson's, 103
S. Ct. at 2I67 n.4.
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that the taking of the depositions was an unfair labor practice."'" Although this ruling was
not considered by the Supreme Court in its review,27 t the practical effect of the Bill
Johnson's reasonable basis standard may be to preclude the Board front enjoining similar
future attempts to circumvent its restricted discovery rules.'" Prior to Bill Johnson's, if an
employer or union attempted to bring a baseless state lawsuit for the purpose of using the
state's liberal discovery procedures to obtain information about a pending unfair labor
practice action, the Board could determine that the suit lacked a reasonable basis and
order it permanently enjoined." Under the Bill Johnson's standard, however, the Board is
restricted in its ability to determine if a civil suit has a legitimate basis. 274 Thus, if a civil suit
involves any genuine issues of material fact or state law, t he Board cannot make any
findings concerning these issues, and instead the civil action must be allowed to pro-
ceecl. 2" Although the unlawful use of state discovery and the initiation of retaliatory
lawsuits are distinct unfair labor practices,' when the abuse of discovery is accomplished
within a civil lawsuit, the Board's only effective mechanism of preventing this abuse is to
halt the lawsuit.'" This connection is apparent for two reasons. The first deals with
timing. If the Board must wait until the employer or union begins to use the state
discovery procedures to obtain information relating to the Board's proceeding, the
intimidation and coercion of employees will have already begun: 278 Even if the employer's
or union's civil suit is subsequently dismissed, the chilling effect of the discovery related
intimidation will discourage the filing of other unfair labor practice charges, and thereby
undermine the self-enforcing mechanism of the NILIZA. 27 •
The second reason why the Board will only be able to prevent abuses of discovery
procedures if it can enjoin the state suit involves complicated notions of federalism and
the Board's role in enforcing_ .national labor law policies. I f the civil suit is facially valid and
factual issues overlap in the state and Board actions, the use of state discovery devices to
obtain information associated with the state proceeding cannot automatically be labelled
an unfair labor practice.'" State discovery procedures are an integral part of the state
27" Id, at 168. The use of the state court discovery to circumvent the Board's rules was a separate
holding front the Ails conclusion that the slate suit was retaliatory and, therefore, an unfair labor
practice. See id. at 169.
"' See Bill Johnson's, 103 S. Ct. at 2167 n.4.
272 The Board's counsel in Bill Johnson's recognized this problem. See Brief for the NLRB at 29,
Bill johnsons. See also supra note 260.
222 This is essentially what the Board did in Bill Johnson's. See Bill Johnson's, 249 N.L.R.B. at
I64-68.
271 See .supra notes 226-30 and accompanying text.
27' See supra notes 237-48 and accompanying text.
"'I See Bill Johnsou's, 249 N.L.R.B. at 169. See also supra note 270.
2" See infra notes 278
-83.
27" To protect effectively the charging employee and other witnesses from intimidation, the
unlawful use of discovery must he prevented before it occurs. If the Board cannot enjoin a frivolous
lawsuit, and the employer or union is able to use state court discovery, the damage will already have
occurred. See NLRB v. Robbins Tire Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 239-40 (1978).
2" it is conceivable that, if the employer or union is able to use the state court discovery to pry
into pending Board issues, the Board's worst fears could he realised, i.e. the discovery-related
intimidation is so effective that the employee will decide to drop his charge or other witnesses will
refuse to testify, and the charge cannot he prosecuted. See id. at 214.
2" In Bill Johnson'.s the ALA was able to find that the employer had committed an unfair labor
practice by using the state court discovery procedures because the AU had already determined that
the civil suit was baseless. See Bill Johnson's, 249 N.L.R.B. at 168-69.
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law.'" If the civil suit is presumptively legitimate, the parties to that suit will have a right
fo use stale court procedures„ 2"2
 Although the use of state discovery devices will interfere
with the Board's proceeding, where I he information obtained through slate discovery
relates to the state claim, the Board will have no grounds for claiming that such conduct is
unlawful: Absent the authority to order the civil suit enjoined therefore, employers and
unions will be able to take advantage of this procedural loophole, and the only protection
afforded an employee will be an after-the-fact unfair labor practice charge.'"
Employers and unions have historically demonstrated a strong desire to obtain
pre-hearing discovery' in Board proceedings.'" Numerous attempts have been made to
use the provisions of the FOI A as a door to discovery in unfair labor practice act ions. 2"
Although most of these attempts have been unsuccessf ul,"Billjohnson's has now opened
a new avenue to. discovery. In his opinion in Bill Johnson's, the ALJ recognized that a
ruling that permits litigants to circumvent the Board's discovery procedures will !Promote
the filing of state court suits. 2 P 7
 Encouraged by the Board's new limited ability to enjoin
civil lawsuits, some employers and unions may be willing to bring state court actions for
the sole purpose of using state discovery to gain information about a pending Board
action . 288
 Thus, the clesire for discovery could become a motivating factor in the filing of
retaliatory lawsuit s.' 89
The nature of labor disputes is such that almost every unfair labor practice charge
28' See Guaranty Trust Co. v, York, 326 U.S. 99, 108 (1945). In York the Court discussed the.
distinction between matters of "substance" and matters of "procedure," and although it recognized
that the distinction was not always clear cut, matters of "procedure" arc generally within the con I rol
or the court hearing the dispute. ld. See also Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
282 See Regan v. Merchants Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 530, 533-34 (1949). In Regan the Supreme
Court held that where state law conferred a legal right the state statute of limitation governed the life
Of drat right. hi. The logical extension of the Court's holding in Regan, and other cases following Erie,
is that state procedures are an important element of a state claim. Consequently, where a state right is




 This was t he, result in !fill, ohnson's, The employer inured so quickly in seeking discovery that
theabuse occurred before the Board had an opport unit y lo halt it . ,See jobn8olls, 249 N,L.R.B. at
163. Consequently, the damaging unfair labor practice occurred and the Board could only bring a
charge enter-the-fact. See id. itt 165-68.
2" See .supra notes 148-68 and accompanying text.
282
 See Garvey,supra note 136, at 710; Comment ,NLRB Divovery Pradier,,supro note 136,:u 8513.
2" See supra notes 164-68 and accompanying text.
2" Bill joht.rson'.c, '249 N.L.R. B. at 168. The A Li in Rill Joh rrson stated: "Such a ruling permitting
such conduct would certainly promote the filing of suits, meritorious or not, in state courts to take
advantage of discovery procedures not available to litigants in a Board proceeding." Id.
"" Following the United States Conti of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit's decision in Robbins, in
which the appeals court affirmed an order compelling the Board to release witness statements_ prior
to the hearing, over ninety MIA suits were brought for discovery purposes. Interview with Profes-
sor Kenneth B. Hipp, limner Deputy Assistant General Counsel fin: the NLRB (January 8, 1984).
[While Assistant General Counsel, Professor Hipp supervised the litigation of rhese suits.] This
demonstrated desire, combined with the expressed fears of the All in Bill johnsun's, illustrates the
lengths to which litigants will go in their efforts to obtain discovery in a Board proceeding.
289 Hill johnvnis has in essence provided a two-fold motivation to file a retaliatory lawsuit. The
first stems from the fact that the suit is now less likely to be enjoined, and is therefore more effective
in its retaliatory purpose. The second is that the employer or union will be able to gain access to
information about the pending unfair labor practice charge by using state court discovery proce-
dures. The Iwo aspects, however, overlap. Discovery has been recognized as an especially effective
means of intimidating and coercing employees and witnesses. Its use for informational purposes will
also further the retaliatory purpose. See supra notes 80-86 and accompanying text.
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filed has die potential 10 be the grounds for either a civil abuse of process or a libel
claim.'" An employer or union lawyer who wishes to bypass the Board's discover . y
restrictions, therefore, will not find it difficult to bring a civil suit against an employee who
has filed a charge with the Board. In most cases, the civil lawsuit will turn on a factual issue
of credihility. iOi Because the Board is prohibited from determining genuine factual issues
under the Hilt Johnson's standard, the state court action will be able to proceed, and l
extrinsic utilization of the stale court discovery will he unchecked.
A second aspect of the procedural problem with the standard established in Bill
johitSmis involves a question of federal preemption. 292 Allowing the state court action to
2' See Power Systems, inc., 239 N.L.R.B. 445, 447 (1978); George A. Angle, 242 N.L.R.B. 744,
747 (1979). In both ihese cases the employer alleged that the employee's filing of a charge was an
abuse of process and malicious prosecution. Id. See also Sheet Metal Workers' Union Local 355, 254
N.L.R,B, 773, 777 (1981); The United Credit Bureau of America, Inc., 242 N.L.R.B. 921, 924 (1979)
(where the union alleged that the basis of the employee's charge was fraudulent, and they were
damaged thereby). In BillJohnsonic, the employer's civil claim arose out of a separate factual basis.
Parr of what was claimed to be libelous, however, was the publishing of the statement that the
employer had fired Helton for union activities. Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc., 249 N.L.R.B. 155,
162 (1980).
`91 If the civil suit is based on a claim of malicious prosecution, the employer Call charge Mat the
factual grounds for the employee's unfair labor practice charge are false. in this situation the case
involves a genuine issue of material fact, i.e., the employee's word against the employer's word. See,
e.g., Sheet Metal iVorkrrs, 716 F.2d 1249, 1264-65 (9th Cir. 1983) (case remanded to Board under Bill
Johnson's standard). Further, if the suit involves a libel claim, it will most likely involve a credibility
question. See 1611 Johnson's, 103 S. Ct. at 2172 n.12. (Justice While's illustrative example).
292 The preemption problem involves two levels. The first is a procedural conflict which this
paper considers and analyzes. The second is a complicated problem involving federal/state substan-
tive law conflicts. This second problem was not directly involved in Bill Johnson'.,, nevertheless the
standard established therein will have an effect on such cases. In Bill johhsris, the employer's state
court libel action was factually separate from the question pending before the Board in the unfair
labor practice action. See Rilljohnsoo's, 103 S. Ct. at 2165; Brief for Petitioner at 6, Bill *Vinson's. This
separation of factual issues, however, is unusual. Of the five Board decisions that have applied I he
Power Systems rule and ordered an employer or union to halt a state court ;whom only Bill Johnson's
involved a stare court claim which was factually distinct from the unfair labor practice charge
pending before the Board. See supra note 198. lo Bill JohosoWs. Melton's unfair labor practice was
based on the charge that she was fired for attempting to organize a union. Bill Johnsoris,103 S. CI. at
2165. The employer's civil claim was 'coed on the grounds that Helton and oilier employees libeled
the employer with false statements in leaflets the employees distributed while picketing. See Bill
johosras, 249 N.L.R.B. at 157, 162, In the other four eases decided under the Power Systems rule,
however, the employers' or unions' slate court actions were in the nature of abuse of process actions,
and, therefore. depended either upon a determination of the employees' probable cause for filing
the charge, me George A. Angle. 242 N.L.R.B. 744, 746-47 (1979); Power Syst ems, Inc.. 239 N.L.R.B.
445, 448 (1078); or upon the same factual questions already pending before the Board. See Sheet
Metal Workers' Union Local 355, 254 N.L.R.B. 773, 779 (1981); The United Credit Bureau of
America, Inc.., 242 N.L.R.B. 921, 926 (1979). Before the Supreme Court's decision in Rill Johnson's,
such overlapping factual issues, which were properly before the Board, were determined by the
Board and used to decide both the merits of the unfair labor practice charge and the basis of the state
court suit. See Power Systems, 239 N.I,.R.B. at 447-50. Under the Bill Johnson's standard, however, t he
Board can only order a mate suit enjoined if the overlapping factual issues are preempted. See Sheri
Metal, 716 F.2d at 1265 n.16. In cases where the factual issues in the mate and Board actions are
"intertwined" the issue may be preempted, see United Credit of America. Inc. v. NLRB, 643 F.2d
1017, 1026 (4th Cir. 1981); however, as the Board's exclusive jurisdiction over labor issues is
narrowly construed, see Sears v. Carpenter, 436 U.S. 180, 2114-08 (1978), this question will not be
clear cut. For example, in Sheet Metal Workers Local 355 v. NLRB, 716 F.2ii 1249 (01h Cir. 1983),
the first circuit court case to apply the Bill johoson'A standard, the employee alleged that his union had
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proceed concurrently with the unfair labor practice action will potentially involve conflicts
between state and federal law. 2" Assuming that employers and unions use state court
discovery to circumvent the Board's rules, the stale court procedures will come into direct
conflict with the Board's established procedures. 2" The Board recognized this conflict in
Bill Johnson's and held that state court discovery should have been preempted to the
extent that it went beyond what the Board's rules allowed. 295 Justice Brennan's concurr-
ence in Bill jollosaa's makes clear that the Board still has authority to enjoin state lawsuits
that are substantively preempted by federal law.'" Nevertheless, it is doubtful whether
the existence of the Board's procedure alone, would be a sufficient basis to preempt state
discovery procedures in an otherwise valid state court action. 29 ' State court procedures
have been recognized as an integral part of state law, to allow the Board to preempt state
discovery rules would seem to turn the Erie doctrine on its head. 2" Indeed, as -justice
Brennatt's concurrence discussed the issue of preemption and concluded that the issues in
Bill Johnson's were not preempted by federal law,' the conflict between the scope of
Board and state court discovery is probably an insufficient basis to preempt the use of
state court discovery. 300 Where the state action is not substantively preempted,'' there-
fore, the Board will be required to apply the Bill Johnson's reasonable basis standard
before ordering the suit enjoined. Here again, because this standard makes it difficult for
the Board to determine the requisite baselessness of a state suit, the practical effect of the
Court's opinion will be to preclude the Board from controlling abuses of discovery.
Although the constitutional considerations involved in Bill Johnson 's requires that the
Board be limited in its ability to determine the basis of a slate court action, 302 the
verbally extended the time required to pay his union dues; however, when the employee was fired
because his dues were not paid on lime , he filed a charge with the Board. The union then brought a
state court action alleging that it had not granted the employee an extension. Id. The appeals court
refused, however, to enforce the Board order even though the court recognized that the factual
issues upon which the employee's unfair labor practice charge turned, were the exact issues in
question in the union's state court action. Id. at 1'263.
Because it is not entirely clear how the Bill Johnson's standard will affect cases where the factual
issues overlap, the standard may have the undesirable result of allowing the Board and a state court
to hear and decide the same factual issues concurrently. Although the Board and the state court will
be applying their factual determinations to distinct legal questions, different findings could produce
complex federalist conflicts.
193 See United Credit Bureau of America, Inc. v. NLRB, 643 F.2d 1017, 1025-26 (4th Cir. 1981).
See also ,supra note 292.
294 See Bill Johnson's, 249 N.L.R.B. at 168.
295 Id. The Board's ruling was in the past tense — should have been — because by the time the
issue came before the ALj the abuse of discovery was an accomplished fact. Id.
296 Billjohnson's, 103 S. Ct. tit 2176 (Brennan, J., concurring); see also Sheet Metal Workers Local
355 v. NLRB, 716 F.2d 1249, 1265 n.16 (9th Cir. 1983).
297 See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S, 99, 108 (1945); Regan v. Merchants Transfer Co.,
337 U.S. 530, 533 -34 (1949); see also supra notes 281 - 82.
2" See Eric Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
2" See .supra note 250.
'" It is also significant to note that in Bill Johnson's, the Al tf made his conclusion of preemption
in a case in which he had already determined that the civil suit was without merit. Bill Johnson's, 249
N.L.R.B. at 169. Absent this holding, it is unclear as to whether the AI J's conclusion on preemption
would be valid.
Because the Court has narrowly construed federal labor law preemption, substantive
preemption will be rare. See supra note 292.
502 Given the litigant's right of access to state court and the state's compelling interest in
maintaining domestic peace, it does not seem legally desirable to restructure the Bill Johnson's
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procedural effect of such a standard leads to the exact result the Court sought to avoid in
Robbins. 303 In Robbins, the Court held that the FOIA, which was designed to deal with
disclosure in general, should not affect the Board's discovery rules."' If the standard
established in Bit/Johnson's, which was designed to protect litigants' constitutional rights,
prevents the Board from enjoining civil litigants from circumventing its discovery proce-
dures, the indirect result of Bin Johnson's would be inconsistent with the logic and
rationale of Robbin.s. . 3"5 Although the question of discovery was not directly considered in
Bill Johnson's, the Court was aware that a narrow standard could have procedural ramifica-
tions on the Board's discovery rules."' To prohibit, in effect, the Board from ordering
state suits enjoined leaves an after-the-fact unfair labor practice charge as the sole method
of protecting employees from discovery related intimidation. The Court in Robbins,
however, stated that such post hoc action is "no substitute for a prophylactic rule that
prevents the harm to a pending enforcement proceeding which flows from a witness
having been intimidated. -307
The liberal provisions of state court discovery will potentially subject employees to
the exact type of intimidation and coercion that the Board's rules are designed to prevent.
Indeed, the Court in Robbin.s recognized that abuses of discovery have the potential to
create a chilling effect on employees willingness to pursue their rights under the
NLRA. 308 Because the Board must rely upon aggrieved parties to file charges,w 9 the
enforcement of the NLRA is directly dependent upon the willingness of individuals to
bring complaints and give testimony."' The broad language of section 8(a)(4) of the
NLRA, which makes it an unfair labor practice to discriminate against an employee
because he has filed charges or given testimony in a Board proceeding, has been inter-
preted as "consistent with an intention to prevent. the Board's channel of information
standard. See Bill Johnson's, 103 S. Ct. at 2169. The problem that the Court recognized with the
Board's earlier Power Systems rule was that, in the Board's inquiry into the basis for the civil suit, the
Board often had to make findings that were tantamount to determining the merits of the suit. See id.
at 2166, 2171-72. As in Hill Johnson's, where the factual allegations oldie civil suit are separate from
the factual allegations involved in the unfair labor practice action, constitutional considerations
require the Board to be limited in its baselessness inquiry. Id. at 2169-70. Even, however, where the
factual issues in the civil suit are the same as the factual questions in the unfair labor practice, the
Constitution prohibits the Board from determining the overlapping factual issue and applying it so
as to determine the basis of the civil suit. See Sheet Metal Workers' Local 355 v. NLRB, 716 F.2d
1249, 1263-65 (9th Cir. 1983); see also supra note 292.
3°3 See supra notes 87-111 and accompanying text.
"4 NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 238-39 (1978).
305 See Bill Johnson's, 249 N.L.R.B. at 168. See also Brief for the NLRB at 28-29, Bill Johnson's.
346 The central issue in Bill Johnson's involved the circumstances under which the Board can
order a civil litigant to halt a state court action. See Bill Johnson's, 103 S. Ct. at 2165. In making their
arguments before the Supreme Court in Bill Johnson's, however, both the petitioner and the Board
discussed the use of state court discovery to gain information about pending unfair labor practice
proceedings. See Petitioner's Brief at 7-8, 31, 33-34; NLRB Brief at 28 -29.
3°7 Robbins, 437 U.S. at 239-40. In addition, Justice Powell in Robbins recognized that "although
the Board may be able to impose post hoc sanctions for interference with its witnesses, these remedies
cannot safeguard fully the integrity of ongoing unfair tabor practice proceedings." Id. at 251 (Powell,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
308 Robbins, 437 U.S. at 239. See also United Credit Bureau of America, Inc. v. NLRB, 643 F.2d
1017, 1023-24 (4th Cir. 1981).
3" See 29 C.F.R. * 102.9 (1983).
3 '° See Robbins, 437 U.S. at 240; Sheet Metal Workers, 716 F.2d at 1259-60; United Credit Bureau q.
America, 643 F.2d at 1024.
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from being dried-up by employer intimidation."' rI'o allow employers and unions to
frequently and consistently use state court discovery rules to intimidate employees,
therefore, opens unfair labor practice proceedings to the precise kind of abuses the
National Labor Relations Act was specifically designed to foreclose. 3 ' 2
I V. A PRocintutAt, Pt.toPosm.
The dilemma created by a state court suit brought after an unfair labor practice
charge has been filed involves balancing the need to safeguard the employer's or union's
right to have the civil claim adjudicated in state court,''' and the need to protect the
employee's statutory rights.'" The problem, as well as the solution, depends largely on
the tintirig of the Iwo actions. The mandate of Bill Johnson's is that, absent complete
federal preemption, the Board cannot determine any genuine issues of material fact or
stale law involved in the civil lawsuit.' If' the slate court action proceeds at the same time
as the Board's action, however, there is substantial danger that the procedures of the
actions will conflict. This danger is especially evident when the allowable scope of discov-
ery before the different tribunals is considered.'" Such conflicts could he avoided,
however, if, while the Board's unfair labor practice hearing was allowed to proceed,' the
state court action was temporarily enjoined. The NLRA currently provides a procedure
that will allow the Board to petition for such temporary relief.'" Unlike the situation
considered by the Supreme Court in Bill Johnson's, under this procedure the Board will
not be required to determine any material issues affecting the rights of employers gr -
unions because there will be neither a holding on the actual merits of the civil lawsuit
itself, nor a permanent injunction.
Section 10(j) of the NLRA authorizes the Board to petition a federal district court to
temporarily enjoin an alleged unfair labor practice prior to the Board's hearing.'" The
purpose of section 10(j) is to aid the Board in its efforts to hear and determine unfair
labor practice charges by affording interim relief in cases where the Board needs to
'" George A. Angle v. NLRB, 683 F.2d 1296, 1300 n.2 (10th Cir. 1982) Walling John Hancock
v. NLRB, 191 F.2d 483, 483 (D.C. Cir. 1951)). See also NLRB v. Scrivener, 405 U.S. 117, 122 (1972).
312 See Bill it	 , 249 N. L.R.B. at 168.
This is the right recognized in Bill Johnson's, 103 S. Ct. at 2173.
3 " This is the right recognized in Bobbins, 437 U.S. at 241.
315 Bill fohnson:v, 103 S. Ct. at 2171-72. See alw Sheet Metal Workers Local 355 v. NLRB, 716
F.2d 1247, 1263-65 (9th Cit . , 1983).
31e See supra notes 261-91 and accompanying text.
' 17 The unfair labor practice which is allowed to proceed is the initial charge filed prior to the
state court action, In sit nations where the state court suit is believes] to he retaliatory and/or an :Muse
of discovery, a second charge will subsequently be Iilccl. This charge, however, will not proceed! but
will await the determination Of the stale court action. Sre johnsan'A, 103 S. Ct, at 2171-72.
See 29 U.S.C. 1 160(j) (1982).
3 ' 9 M. The provision states:
The Board shall have power, upon issuance of a complaint as provided in subsection (b)
of this section charging that any person has engaged in or is engaging in an Unfair labor
practice, to petition any United States district court, within any district wherein the
unfair labor practice in question is alleged to have occurred or wherein such person
resides or transacts business, for appropriate temporary relief or restraining order.
Upon the filing of any such petition the court shall cause notice thereof to he served
upon such person, and thereupon shall have jurisdiction to grant to the Board such
temporary relief or test raining order as it deems just and proper.
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preserve the status quo and prevent the frustration of the NLRA pending the final
outcome of its proceeding.'" Accordingly, the district court does not decide the merits of
the underlying unfair labor practice charge in ruling on a section 10(j) petition."' instead,
a district court's inquiry is limited to a determination of whether the Board has "reason-
able cause" to believe that the elements of an unfair labor practice are present."'" Al-
though section 10(j) does not define this "reasonable cause" standa•d, 323 because the
remedy is designed to give quick relief, the evidentiary burden in a section 10(j) proceed-
ing is "relatively insuhstamial." 324 The evidence, therefore, is to he viewed in the light
most favorable to the Board, 325 and if that evidence could reasonably support a finding
that a violation of the NLRA has occurred,' the district court may grant the temporary
relief it "deems just and proper.” 327 The major considerations involved in ruling on a
section 1 0(j) petition are the need to prevent the frustration of the basic remedial purpose
of the NLRA, the degree to which the public interest will he affected if the relief is not
granted, and the need to restore the status quo.""
As employers and unions begin to use the loophole created by Bill Johnson's, the
Board should be prepared to invoke section 10(j) to prevent the circumvention of its
discovery procedures. When an employee files a charge with the Board and the employer
or union subsequently brings a state court action against the employee, the Board rrmst be
prepared to make a quick administrative determination as to the merits of the suit . 329 This
determination could be accomplished if the Board's Regional Directors established pro-
cedures to monitor the filing of state court actions after an unfair labor practice complaint
has been issued. Under such procedures, the monitored state suits would fall into one of
three general categories. First, the Regional Director may determine that the suit is both
legitimate in its purpose and 'reasonably based. In these circumstances, the Regional
Director should take no action that interferes with the employer's or union's right to
litigate state court claims."'" Second, the Regional Director may determine that the suit is
3" See Levine v. C & W Mining Co., 610 F.2d 432, 436 (6th Cir. 1979); Moire v. Pilot Freight
Carriers, Inc., 515 F.2(11185, 1189-90 (56h Cir. 1975), reh'g denied, 521 F.2d 785, cert. denied, 426 U.S.
934 (1976); Herzog v. Parson, 181 F.2d 78 1, 786 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 810 (1950).
33 ' Humphrey v. International Longshoreman's Assn, 548 F.2d 494, 497 (4th Cir. 1977);
Squillacote v. International Union, United Auto, et. al., 383 F. Supp. 491, 493 (E.D. Wis. 1974);
Fusco v. Richard W. Kaasc Baking Co., 205 F. Supp. 459, 462 (N.D. Ohio 1962).
321 See Squillacote v. Local 248, Meat & Allied Food Wkrs., 543 F.2d 735, 743 (7th Cir. 1976);
Seeley y. Trading Post, Inc., 517 F.2d 33, 36-37 (2c1 Cir. 1975); see also Note, The Case fin . Quick Rehr!:
Use q. Seciion 10(j) of the Labor-Management fielation.k Act in Discriminatory Discharge Cases, 56 IND.
515, 532-38 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Note, Tice Case for Quick Relief].
723 See 29 U.S.C. § 160(j) (1976).
324 Levine v. C & W Mining Co., 610 F.2d 432, 435 (6th Cir. 1979); Squillacote v. Local 248,
Meat & Allied Food Wkrs., 543 F.2d 735, 744 (7th Cir. 1976); Squillacote v. International Union,
United Auto, et. al., 383 F. Supp. 491, 492-93 (M.D. Wis. 1974); Fusco v. Richard W. Kaase Baking
Co., 205 F. Supp. 459, 463 (N.D. Ohio 1962).
32s
	 Seeler v. Trading Post, Inc., 517 F.2d 33, 37 (2d Cir. 1975)(" t he Regional Director should
be given the benefit of the doubt in a proceeding for 10(j) relief'').
32" See supra note 322.
3" See 29 U.S.C. § 160(j) (1982).
a" See Squillacote v. Local 248, Meat & Allied Food Wkrs., 534 1.7 .2d 735, 744 (7th Cir. 1976).
32" Timing will be essential because once discovery begins in the state court suit, the damage will
have been done. Although section 10(j) petitions are designed to be expeditious, any judicial
proceeding takes time See infra note 357.
33° This would be consistent with the Board's established practice under the Clyde Topor doc-
trine. See .supra notes 179-83 and accompanying text.
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brought for the put-pose of circumventing the Board's discovery rules and that the suit is
baseless under the Bill Johnson's standard. Under these circumstances the Regional Direc-
tor should issue a second unfair labor practice charge and seek a Board order requiring
the employer or union to cease prosecuting the state court action. 33 ' Third, the Regional
Director may believe that the suit is brOught for the purpose of circumventing the Board's
discovery rules, however, because the suit involves a genuine issue of fact or law, the
Board cannot order the suit enjoined under the Bill Johnson's standard. Faced with these
circumstances, the Regional Director should immediately petition for section 10(j) relief.
Although the Board had petitioned a district court pursuant to section 10(j) in Bill
Johnson's , 332 the district court denied the injunction because it was under the "erroneous
view" that a state suit could never be enjoined. 333 As the Supreme Court in Bill Johnson's
held that state suits are enjoinahle in certain situations, 334 section 10(j) petitions are still
viable procedures. Nevertheless, in light of the new reasonable basis standard established
by the Supreme Court in Bill Johnson's, the Board will have to restructure and adapt its use
of section 10(j) to prevent the circumvention of its discovery rules.
The first. problem in attempting to use section 10(j) is the Board's historical reluc-
tance to invoke this provision. Traditionally, the Board has never used section 10(j)
extensively.335 Although Congress336 and commentators337
 have urged the Board to ex-
pand the use of section 10(j), the Board has maintained that section 10(j) is to be used with
considerable restraint. 338
 Accordingly, the Board has invoked its discretionary power
under section 10(j) for such unfair labor practices as mass picketing and picket line
violence, 3" but it has been reluctant to seek I 0(j) relief in other situations."" A conse-
quence of the Board's attitude is that a relatively small amount of t he Board's resources
have been allocated for section 10(j) use."' As employers and unions begin to use state
court discovery procedures to pry into unfair labor practice proceedings, the Board will
have to either greatly increase its use of section I 0(j) or allow its discovery rules to be
circumvented. Given the intimidating effect that unguarded discovery could have on
employees 342
 and the substantial chilling effect that such a practice would have on
n' The Supreme Court authorized the Board to halt state court actions that can be found to be
both retaliatory and baseless if, uch actions do not involve any genuine issue of material fact or state
law. See Bill Johnson's, 103 S. Ct. at 2171 - 72.
"2
 Id. at 2166 rr,2.
33' See id. at 2174 n.15,
334 Id. at 2171-72.
3'33 See Siegel, Section low (y- the National Labor Relations Act: Suggested Reforms,for an Expanded Use,
13 B.C. [Non. C. L. REV, 457, 482 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Siegel]; Note, Section 10(j) of the National
Labor Relations Act: Increased Exercise of Federal jurisdiction Over Labor Disputes, 49 U. CINN, L. REV. 415,
438 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Note, Section 10(j) oldie National labor Relations Act]; Note, The Case for
Quick Relief, supra note 3'22, at 516.
339 See Labor Reform Act, H•R. 8410, 95th Cong., lot Sess. (1977). 123 Cosici. REC. H32,613
(1977).
"7 See Siegel, supra note 335, at 482; Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation
Elections Under the National Labor Relations Act, 78 H ARV. L. REV. 38, 130-31 (1964); Note, Section 10(D
of the National Labor Relations Act ,supra note 335, at 438; Note, The Case far Quick Relief, supra note 322,
at 539.
33' Address by NLRB General Counsel Denham, San Francisco Bay Chapter of the Society for
the Advancement of Management (October, 1949), reprinted us, 23 L.R.R.M. 44, 45 (1949).
339 See Wilson v. UAW, 97 L.R.R.M. 2013 (S.D. lowa 1977); Hendrix v. Amalgamated Meat
Critter's, 95 L.R.R.M. 2706 (I). Neb. 1977).
34o
	 Note, The Case Jar Quick Relief, supra note 322, at 516 - 17.
34 ' Id. at 530-31.
340 See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
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employee willingness to bring charges,' the Board should expand the use of section
10(j), even if this expansion entails a reallocation of its resources.
A second problem with attempting to use section 10(j) as a procedural solution to the
loophole created in Bill Johnson's will be the unwillingness of certain district courts to grant
such temporary relief. Although the standard for granting relief under section 10(j) is
"reasonable cause" to believe that the NLRA has been violated,' some courts impose
additional requirements that the Board must satisfy to show that injunctive relief is just
and proper." 5 Thus, in addition to a reasonable cause showing, the Board has been
required to demonstrate that the case is of an "extraordinary nature," 346 or that the
section 10(j) injunction is necessary to "prevent irreparable harm." 347 To satisfy these
additional requirements, the Board will have to demonstrate that where an initial unfair
labor practice charge has been filed and the respondent to that charge brings a state court
action, there is substantial danger that the use of state court discovery will interfere with
the prosecution of the Board's initial proceeding. Although the Board's primary concern
will be the circumvention of its discovery procedures, if it waits until the abuse of
discovery actually manifests itself, the interference with its proceedings will already have
occurred. 348 The Board will, therefore, have to argue that effective enforcement of the
NLRA requires that its procedures be isolated from outside interference.
To make such an argument, the Board will have to show that there is reasonable
cause to believe that the civil suit is an unfair labor practice."' This showing will require
the Board to demonstrate that the state suit is both retaliatory and baseless. 35" A federal
court acting pursuant to section 10(j) jurisdiction, however, will not be constrained by the
Bill Johnson's reasonable basis standard. Because the district court will not actually decide
the merits of whether the civil stilt is a retaliatory unfair labor practice,' it will he free to
consider material issues of fact and state law to determine whether there is reasonable
cause to believe that the civil suit is baseless. 352 A section 10(j) hearing, therefore, will
involve a limited judicial inquiry in which the Board will have to demonstrate t hatt the civil
suit possesses the elements of an unfair labor practice. Nevertheless, even if I he district
court temporarily enjoins the suit, no constitutional rights of employers or unions will he
343 See supra notes 105 -06 and accompanying text.
3" See supra notes 322 -28 and accompanying text.
345
	 iqfra notes 346-55.
3" See Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Meter, 385 F.2d 265, 270-71 (8th Cir. 1967); we also
Note, The Case for Quick Relief, supra note 322, at 534.
347 See McCleod v. General Electric Co., 366 F.2d 847, 850 (2d Cir. 1966), vacated and remanded,
385 U.S. 533 (1967); Fuchs v. Steel-Fab, Inc., 365 F. Stipp. 385, 387 (1). Mass. 1973).
' 4" In Bill Johnson's the abuse of' discovery transpired before the suit had been enjoined, See Bill
Johnson's, 249 N.L.R.B. at 163. Although the AL,j subsequently held this abuse to be an unfair labor
pract ice, id. at 168, the Supreme Court in Robbins recognized that if employees' statutory rights under
the NLRA were to be protected, the intimidation associated with discovery must be prevented prior
to its occurrence. Robbins, 437 U.S. at 239 -40.
"' See supra note 322 and accompanying text.
"" As the Board will he arguing that the retaliatory suit is the temporarily enjoinable unfair
labor practice, the Supreme Court's requirements that the suit he both retaliatory in motivation and
baseless must still be met. See Hill Johnson's, 103 S. Ct. at 2173.
3" See supra note 320 and accompanying test.
"2 An additional advantage of using a section 10(j) remedy is the familiarity that a district court
judge has with local state law. Thus, although the district court judges will not actually decide the
merits of t he unfair labor practice charge, her familiarity with state law will make her a good judge of
the basis of the state law claim.
836	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
	
[Vol. 25:805
affected, because the merits of the suit will he preserved for determination by a stale court
after the Board has concluded its initial unfair labor practice proceechng.' 53
The Supreme Court in /id/Johnson's specifically left the particular procedures for
making the reasonable basis determination "entirely to the Board's discretion." 3" 4 Fur-
ther, in his concurrence, Justice Brennan stressed that, absent a constitutional violation,
the Board is free to structure its proceedings as it sees rd.' A section 10(j) injunction
would not violate an employer's or union's right of access to state court, nor would it
prevent the stale from providing a remedy for a dispute that affects its interest.'"
Employing a section 10(j) procedure would isolate t he initial unfair labor practice action
from outside procedural interference."" After the conclusion of the initial unfair labor
practice hearing, the civil litigation would resume and proceed to a determination.
Then, only if the state court found that the civil suit was baseless would the Board
prosecute the retaliatory unfair labor practice charge. 359 The major advantage under this
procedure is that the board will control the scope of discovery affecting its unfair labor
practice proceeding without violating the employer's or union's stale court rights.
A final problem that may undercut the effectiveness of a section 10(j) petition is the
unguarded use of discovery in the district court. The discovery provisions of the Federal
353 In Bill Johnson's the Al4 consolidated Helton's initial unfair labor practice charge with her
second charge. See Bill Johnson's, 103 S. Ct. at 2166. Where the Board is seeking to prevent the use of
stare court discovery front interfering with its proceedings, the two 13 afair labor practice charges will
have to be separated. Under the Supreme Court's standard established in Bill Johnson's, the Board
cannot hold the stare court action to be retaliatory unless the suit is found to he baseless. Id. at 2173.
In roost cases, however, this determination will have to he decided by the state court. See .suprn notes
290 -91 and accompanying text. The Board will therefbre, have to await the conclusion of the civil
claim in state court before prosecuting its retaliatory unfair labor practice charge. See Johnson's,
103 S. Ct. at 2171.
a" Hill Johnson's, 103 S. Ct. at 2171 11.11.
'' Id. at 2176 (Brennan, J., concurring). justice Brennan stated:
The scope of our review of the procedures the Board uses to accomplish its mission is
limited, and the constitutional constraints on them are attenuated. Unless the agency
goes beyond its statutory mandate, violates its own procedures, or fails to provide an
affected party due process of law, we have no role in specifying what methods it may or
may not use in finding facts or reaching conclusions of law and policy.
Id. See also Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 935
U.S. 510, 548-49 (1978).
"" As these were the only constitutional rights the Bill Johnson's court recognized, their absence
leaves the Board free to structure its proceeding as it secs lit. Bit/Joh/019W), 103 S. Ct. at 2163-71. See
also .cupro note 350.
3." The section 10(j) remedy, however, will only be effective where the civil suit is baseless.
Although a meritorious suit that utilizes state court discovery to pry into a Board proceeding may he
an unfair labor practice, enjoining the abuse before it occurs will be very difficult. See Bill Johnson's,
249 N.L.R.B. at 162. See also supra note 270. Moreover, where the issues involved in the civil suit
overlap with the issues involved in the uidair labor practice action, in is not entirely clear' whether the
Board can enjoin the use of state court discovery even where it can act in time. See supra note 292.
Thus, where the employer or union has a legitimate state court claim against an employee who
had filed a charge, the Board will probably he unable to prevent the use of state court discovery to
pry into Board matters. Nevertheless, this is not the problem created by Bill Johnso0 because
arguably the majority of suits brought subsequently to Bill Johnsorts will he baseless,
3"
 An injunction under section 10(j) is generally limited to no longer than six mouths, and
terminates automatically on a final order of the Board in the initial unfair labor case. See Eisenberg v.
Hartz Mountain Corp., 519 F.2d 138, 144 (3d Cir. 1975).
339 See Bill Johnson's, 103 S. Ct. at 2172,
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Rules of Civil Procedure apply in proceedings under section 10(1). 36" Although section
10(j) proceedings are designed to be limited in scope 31 ' and expeditious, 262 some district
courts have allowed litigants to use their liberal discovery provisions to obtain information
associated with the Board's unfair labor practice proceedings. 363 To allow employers or
unions to circumvent the Board's rules in this manner, when it is precisely to avoid such a
problem that the Board has petitioned the district court in the first place, would be
inconsistent with Robbins and the line of cases supporting that decision. 364 District courts
dealing with the analogous petition under section 10(1) 365 have limited discovery to the
issue raised by the petition for injuna ion. 3"" Section 10(1) requires the Board to seek
temporary relief in a delineated class of unfair labor practices after a charge is filed but
hefore the complaint issues. Thus, although section 10(j) is discretionary and section 10(1)
is mandatory, the relief sought under both petitions is similar. A limitation on the scope of
discovery in a section 10(j) petition would preserve the Board's discovery rules and still
enable the district court to have a full and open section 10(j) hearing.
CoNc i.u s tos;
lit Bill Johnson's Reslaumins, Inc. v. NLRB, the Supreme Court was primarily con-
cerned with protecting; the constitutional rights of civil litigants. By establishing a narrow
reasonable basis standard to safeguard those rights, however, the Court has limited the
Board's ability to halt frivolous state court actions. Recognizing t his limitation, employers
and un ions, who have demonstrated a strong desire for pre-hearing discovery, may now
begin to bring baseless state court actions to circumvent the Board's restrictive discovery
procedures. To close this procedural loophole, and at the same time maintain the rights
of civil litigants, the Board should he prepared to use section 10(j) to temporarily enjoin
state court actions which it has "reasonable cause - to believe baseless.
The Supreme Court gave the Board wide procedural freedom to deal with the
problem of baseless retaliatory civil suits. It would not undercut the Hill Johnson's decision
to use section 1 0(j) as a means of isolating employees from discovery related intimidation.
On the contrary, section 10(j) would provide a prophylactic remedy to the kind of labor
3" See Meter v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 42 F.R.D. 663, 664 (D. Minn. 1967), rev'd, 385
F.2d 265 (8th Cir. 1967).
"I Squiilacorc v. International Union, United Auto, et al., 383 F. Stipp, 491, 493 (E.D. Wis.
1974). The court states: The hearing to he held upon a petition for temporary injunctive relief
under Section 10(j) has a limited evidentiary scope and purpose and is not intended to determine
which litigant should ultimately prevail." Id.
362 Squillacote v. Local 248, Meat & Allied Food Workers, 534 F.2d 735, 743 (7th Cir. 1976).
381  See Meter v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 42 F.R.D. 663, 664 (D. Minn. 1976), rend, 385
F.2d '265 (8th Cir. 1967); Sperandeo v. Milk Drivers & Dairy Employees Local 537, 334 F.2d 381,
384-85 (10th Cir. 1964); Fusco v, Richard W. Kaase Baking Co., 205 F. Stipp. 459, 462 -63 (N.D. Ohio
1962).
a"{
	 supra notes 87 - 122 and accompanying text.
365 29 U.S.C. § 160(1) (1982). This section provides that whenever a person is charged with a
violation of sections 8(b)(4)(A),(B), or (C), 8(b)(7), or 8(e) a preliminary investigation shall be
undertaken, and if the investigating officer has reasonable cause to believe that such charge is true
she shall petition a federal district court for injunctive relief pending the Board's adjudication of the
matter. See id.
3" See Samoff v. Williamsport Building & Construction Trades Council, 451 E.2d 272, 274 (3d
Cir. 1971); Madden v. Milk Wagon Drivers Union Local 753, 229 F. Stipp. 490, 492 (N.D. 111. 1964).
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abuses with which the Court was concerned in both hill johnsun's and Robbins. A tempo-
rary injunction of the state cintrt action would prevent conflicts between state and Board
proceedings, and preserve the rights of all parties.
RoBEter J. Gii.soN
